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The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), created to allow citizens greater access
to government documents, confronted a new challenge after the terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001. FOIA's application has fluctuated over the past four
decades in accordance with congressional amendments and presidential
administrations' interpretations. The Bush Administration has sought to curtail
FOIA's reach by implementing a "sound legal basis" standard for FOIA
requests in the interests of homeland protection-a move that has garnered
substantial criticism from media organizations and open-government advocates.
A recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia has vindicated the Administration's policy by deferring to agency
expertise on matters of security and law enforcement. This Note argues that
courts should defer to the decisions of law enforcement agencies to withhold
information requests under FOIA in an effort to promote greater homeland
protection. However, courts must still ensure that there is at least a minimal
articulation regarding why such deference is reasonable.
"[Plublic disclosure is not always in the public interest ......
I. INTRODUCTION
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)2 was enacted in the mid-1960s to
give American citizens greater access to government documents in an effort to
prevent both the practice and perception of government secrecy. 3 The world has
changed considerably since the mid-1960s, most recently with the tragic attacks
on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. In reaction
* Captain, United States Air Force, and J.D. Candidate, The Ohio State University, Moritz
College of Law (2004). B.S., United States Air Force Academy (1998). The views expressed in
this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United
States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the United States Government. Thanks to my wife,
Jaime, for all of her encouragement throughout the note-writing process, Cody Braithwaite for
his efforts in editing this Note, and Mr. Robert Clayton at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base for
initially exposing me to the Freedom of Information Act.
I CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 167 (1985).
2 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
See 110 CONG. REc. 17,087 (1964) (statement of Sen. Long). "A government by
secrecy benefits no one. It injures the people it seeks to serve; it damages its own
integrity and operation. It breeds distrust, dampens the fervor of its citizens and masks
their loyalty."
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to the attacks, the federal government quickly tightened security.4 Only weeks
later, Attorney General John Ashcroft issued a memorandum to all federal
departments and agencies that stated the Bush Administration's commitment to
complying with the requirements of FOIA,5 but hinted that agencies would be
given more discretion to retain information.6 The post-9/11 world has marked a
new era in the history of FOIA, one that has sparked significant controversy. 7
This Note argues that this increased deference, if any, for law enforcement
agencies to withhold information under exemption 1 or exemption 7 of FOIA8 is
a necessary step to promote greater homeland protection. While extending
deference, the courts must still ensure that the government takes steps to
reasonably segregate requested information. Such deference must be
appropriately limited to matters of homeland security. While courts should defer
to the expertise of agencies, the courts still have the initial screening function of
ensuring that there is at least minimal articulation of why the exemptions are
reasonable.
Part 11 of this Note addresses why open government is important in the
aftermath of September 1 th. Part 111 traces the history of FOIA from its inception
in 1966, through multiple amendments, presidential administration adjustments,
4 Most notable was the federal enactment of the "Uniting and Strengthening America By
Providing Appropriate Tools Required To Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act," better known
as the USA-PATRIOT Act which, among other expansions in law enforcement and prevention
powers, increased the government's electronic surveillance powers in multiple ways. See
DANIEL J. SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 341-44 (2003)
(providing descriptions of the Act's changes in definition of terrorism, delayed notice of search
warrants, and expansion of wire tap use by government agencies). For an analysis of how the
USA-PATRIOT Act developed, see Steven Brill, After.: How America Confronted the Sept. 12
Era, NEwsWEEK, Mar. 10, 2003, at 66.
5 John Ashcroft, Memorandum for Heads of All Federal Departments and Agencies on the
Freedom of Information Act (Oct. 12, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/04foia/
01 1012.htm. See infra note 76.
6 See infra Section IV(A).
7 See Charles N. Davis, The Freedom of Information Center, Celebrate the Freedom of
Information Act's 37th Anniversary on March 16, 2003!, at http://foi.missouri.edu/federalfoia/
celebratefoia.html (last updated Feb. 20, 2003) ("Much has been said and written about the
Bush Administration's post-Sept. 11 clampdown on information, which has vastly expanded the
zone of secrecy surrounding the White House, the govemment's anti-terrorism efforts and even
more benign government documents.").
8 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1), (7) (2000) (exempting classified information in the interest of
national defense and information compiled for law enforcement purposes). The construction of
FOIA allows total disclosure of requested government documents, unless the request is
specifically exempted in one of the first seven categories in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(7). Courts are
to evaluate "whether such records or any part thereof shall be withheld under any of the
exemptions set forth in subsection (b) of this section, and the burden is on the agency to sustain
its action." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B).
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and significant court cases. Part IV highlights the "changes" to FOIA after
September 1lth by the Bush Administration. Part V analyzes one of the first
appellate court cases dealing with the FOIA law enforcement exemptions after
9/11, Center for National Security Studies v. United States Department of Justice.
Part VI argues that greater deference to FOIA exemptions is appropriate and
necessary as long as the government demonstrates a reasonable attempt to
segregate requested information, and as long as it is applied only to homeland
security matters.
11. IMPORTANCE OF OPEN GOVERNMENT IN THE AFERMATH OF
SEPTEMBER 1 ITH
The Freedom of Information Act was created to protect the public's "right to
know what its government is doing"9 by establishing "a general philosophy of
full agency disclosure unless information is exempted under clearly delineated
statutory language."10 The preeminent principle behind FOIA was to ensure the
public's right to know what its "[g]overnment is up to."'l This was a dramatic
step toward the democratic ideal of an open government 12 considering the fact
that "[s]ecrecy in American government has a long history." 13 While desiring
9 S. REP. No. 89-813, at 5 (1965).
10 Id. at 3; see Mathew J. Salzman, Exemption 7(D) of the Freedom of Information Act-
The Evidentiary Showing the Government Must Make to Establish that a Source is
Confidential, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1041, 1042 (1994).
11 United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S.
749, 773 (1989); see also John Moon, The Freedom of Information Act: A Fundamental
Contradiction, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 1157, 1158 (1985) ('The salient statutory basis of
government disclosure law, the FOIA, is viewed by many as one of the crown jewels of
liberalism.").
12 See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1964) (Black, J., concurring)
("The press was protected [by the First Amendment] so that it could bare the secrets of
govemment and inform the people."); Moon, supra note 11, at 1169 ("Several commentators
have argued that the Constitution provides an implicit right to governmental
information .... [T]he Framers intended the first amendment to encompass a right to
government access."); see also Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 772-73 (explaining that the
purpose of FOIA is to lift the veil of "secrecy in government").
13 Martin D. Halstuk, Policy of Secrecy-Pattern of Deception: What Federalist Leaders
Thought About a Public Right to Know, 1794-98, 7 CoMM. L. & POL'Y 51, 58 (2002)
(providing extended discussion on the Framers' views on public access to government and
freedom of the press). For an extensive discussion on the history of government non-disclosure
of information during wartime, see generally JEFFREY A. SMITH, WAR & PRESS FREEDOM: THE
PROBLEM OF PREROGATIVE POWER (1999).
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open disclosure as much as possible, 14 even the Framers recognized that there
should be limits and that important matters of state must be allowed to be
conducted with some level of confidentiality. 15 Open government disclosure to
allow for an informed citizenry is a desirable value to protect, but such an interest
must be balanced against the need for the same government to withhold some
information in order to operate effectively and efficiently in protecting its
citizenry. 16
The government has struggled in upholding this democratic ideal of
transparent government after the attacks of September 11th. 17 In the weeks and
14 As Justice Lewis Powell noted, "[Plublic debate must not only be unfettered; it must
also be informed." Saxe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 862-63 (1974) (Powell, J.,
dissenting); see also Martin Scordato & Paula Monopoli, Free Speech Rationales After
September I Ith: The First Amendment in Post-World Trade Center America, 13 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REv. 185, 197 (2002) ("If the legitimate authority of the government comes only from
the consent of the governed, then it is important, in order for the government to possess
legitimate authority, for those granting their consent to be reasonably well informed."); Larry
Maxcy, Letter to the Editor, Secrecy vs. Democracy, N.Y. TIvEs, Jan. 4, 2003, at A10 (quoting
Harry Truman by stating that "[s]ecrecy and a free, democratic government don't mix").
15 See Halstuk, supra note 13, at 74-76 ("The absence of a consensus that the public had a
right to know what government was doing informs the question of whether historical evidence
supports the idea of a First Amendment right of press access to government information.").
Halstuk also stated, "commentators thus are overreaching when they assert there is a post-First
Amendment, Federalist-era basis to support an argument for a constitutional right of access to
government information and operations." Id. But see Moon, supra note 11, at 1169 (pointing
out that several commentators have argued that the Constitution contains an implicit right to
government information based on multiple theories).
16 See ACLU v. Dep't of Justice, 265 F. Supp. 2d 20, 27 (2003) ("FOIA represents a
carefully considered balance between the right of the public to know what their
government is up to and the often compelling interest that the government maintains in
keeping certain information private, whether to protect particular individuals or the
national interest as a whole."); see also Editorial, Why Not Disclose?, WASH. POST, Oct. 31,
2001, at A26. The editorial states:
The government has an enormously difficult and in some ways contradictory task. It must
do its utmost not just to prosecute any surviving conspirators in the Sept. 11 attacks but
also to try to prevent a recurrence. At the same time, lest it abandon some of the very
principles for which it is fighting, it must act within traditional constitutional bounds.
Id.; see also Moon, supra note 11, at 1169 ("The talisman for the Framers was necessity:
society would tolerate governmental secrecy only when necessary for the well-being of the
nation." (internal citation omitted)).
17 See William Zolla II, The War at Home: Rising Tensions between Civil Liberties and
our National Security, 17 CBA REC. 32, 32 (2003). Zolla states:
Critics of the Government, represented by a broad coalition of civil liberties, human rights
and religious groups, as well as academics and media organizations, contend that the
Government's zealous pursuit of terrorists is being waged with little regard for the rights of
the accused suspects or their families, and largely beyond the view of the public.
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months after the attacks, the government engaged in massive investigative efforts
into the attacks and passed preventative measures. 18 A cry went out that civil
liberties were under attack, as some immigrants were tracked and monitored. 19
Free speech against U.S. government actions was viewed as discouraged 20 and
the possibility of profiling against Arab-Americans was the source of fierce public
debate.21
As a conceptual cousin to civil liberties, the attitude and application
surrounding FOIA was also questioned. About 1,100 individuals were detained
for questioning during the government's terrorist investigations,22 and a
substantial number of those were detained for an extended period.23 When
questioned about the arrests and detentions, the Department of Justice would not
disclose any information. 24 These denials led to FOIA requests by various
organizations, one of which was denied, but subsequently appealed in federal
court.25 This appeal, Center for National Security Studies v. United States
Department of Justice, will be the focus of Part V of this Note.26
With civil liberties being impaired and the nation maintaining vigilance
(some would say exhibiting paranoia), FOLA stood, and still stands, at a cross-
Id; see also Scordato & Monopoli, supra note 14, at 185 ("On September 11, 2001, the
American vision of the world changed forever.").
18 See, e.g., USA-PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
19 See Diana Jean Schemo, Access to U.S. Courses Is Under Scrutiny in Aftermath of
Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2001, at B7 (voicing concerns that foreign national students
could face anti-foreign sentiment but also highlighting that colleges could keep better tabs on
what foreign students are studying).
20 See Scordato & Monopoli, supra note 14, at 185-86; see also Bill Carter & Felicity
Barringer, In Patriotic Time, Dissent is Muted: Debate Grows over Balancing Security and
Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2001, at Al.
21 See William Glaberson, Racial Profiling May Get Wider Approval by Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 21, 2001, at A16.
22 Editorial, Disappearing in America, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2001, at A22.
23 Editorial, Government Too Secretive About Jailing Immigrants, ATLANTA J. CONST.,
Nov. 12, 2001, at All ("Civil liberties groups and Justice Department sources have estimated
that 1,100 immigrants-mostly from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Egypt, mostly men in their 20s
and 30s-have been arrested since Sept. 11, and approximately half of those are still being
held.").
24 See Editorial, Why Not Disclose?, supra note 16. The editorial states:
The Department of Justice continues to resist legitimate requests for information regarding
the 1,017 people it acknowledges having detained in its investigation of the Sept. 11
attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. Civil liberties and other groups have
been reduced to filing a request for the data under the Freedom of Information Act.
Id.
25 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2000) (concerning the procedural rules on appeals).
26 Ctr. For Nat'l Sec. Studies v. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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road and challenging time. As the district court noted, "[d]ifficult times such as
these have always tested our fidelity to the core democratic values of openness,
government accountability, and the rule of law." 27 Of particular interest, and the
focus of this inquiry, are exemption 1 and exemption 7 of the FOIA. Exemption 1
protects classified information from disclosure and exemption 7 exempts
releasing information "compiled for law enforcement purposes."
28
How much latitude should these exemptions be given in the post-9/11 world?
Although the national-security context requires increased deference to the
expertise of security and law enforcement agencies, the text of FOIA has not been
altered and courts should continue to play a screening function to satisfy the
exemption language. Thus, federal agencies, most notably law enforcement
agencies in the newly created Office of Homeland Security, 29 are unlikely to
significantly abuse the FOIA exemptions if courts fulfill their screening role by
requiring some articulation for the exemptions and some level of segregation
among requests. Open government is an important interest to a liberal, democratic
society and must be preserved, but an equally vital priority for our society is that
of protection. 30 Any increased deference for law enforcement agencies to
27 Ctr. For Nat'l Sec. Studies v. United States Dep't of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94, 96
(D.D.C. 2002); see also Interview: Professor Jane Kirtley Discusses the Restriction of
Information Released by the Government on the Grounds of National Security Problems (NPR
radio broadcast, Feb. 14, 2002), available at http://www.npr.org/transcripts/story.html
[hereinafter Kirtley Interview] ("[The September 11 th attacks are] making a lot of people very
frightened. And I think the tendency when you're frightened is to develop this sort of bunker
mentality.... That, to me, is irresponsible at any time, but in times of national crisis, it can
really lead to tragedy.").
28 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7).
29 The Office of Homeland Security was created by law on Nov. 25, 2002; the Office
opened on Jan. 24, 2003 to meet the homeland threat posed by terrorism. Pub. L. No. 107-296,
116 Stat. 2135 (2002), (to be codified at 6 U.S.C. § 133). For additional information regarding
the Office of Homeland Security, see generally the Office's official website at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland. Currently there is a discussion on how the Office of
Homeland Security will create its FOIA regulations as required under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1). The
Reporter's Committee for Freedom of the Press is:
[A]sking that the agency incorporate an expedited review provision adopted by the
Department of Justice that gives priority to FOI requesters who can show that there is
"widespread and exceptional media interest in which there exist possible questions about
the government's integrity which affect public confidence." The Justice department had
granted expedited review for some requests regarding arrest of detainees that were made to
the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
The Reporter's Committee for Freedom of the Press, Behind the Homefront, (Feb. 27, 2003), at
http://www.rcfp.org/behindthehomefront/archive/2003_02.htmL
30 Ctr. For Nat'l Sec. Studies, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 96. The court stated:
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withhold information under exemption 1 or exemption 7 of FOIA31 is necessary
to promote security in our current world environment, as long as some
reservations are made.
lI. HISTORY OF FOIA
FOIA has developed over the second half of the twentieth century and now
faces a new challenge after the 9/11 attacks. FOIA application and emphasis has
fluctuated throughout presidential administrations, leading up to the present
controversy with the Bush Administration.
A. Congressional History of FOIA
FOIA had its genesis in the late 1950s when a California congressman named
John Moss became interested in the public's access to government information.
32
During congressional hearings concerning a potential freedom of information bill,
federal agencies, led by the Department of Justice, protested vigorously that costs
outweighed public benefit and the forerunner to the FOIA, the Administrative
Procedure Act, was really not that secretive. 33 But after revisions and political
maneuvering, 34 Senate bill 1160 passed in the Senate in 1965,35 and in the House
on June 20, 1966, by a vote of 308-0.36 President Johnson could have pocket
vetoed the bill, but was persuaded to sign it on July 4, 1966.37 The newly-signed
The Court fully understands and appreciates that the first priority of the executive branch
in a time of crisis is to ensure the physical security of its citizens. By the same token, the
first priority of the judicial branch must be to ensure that our Government always operates
within the statutory and constitutional constraints which distinguish a democracy from a
dictatorship.
Id.
31 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1), (7) (2000) (exempting classified information in the interest of
national defense and information compiled for law enforcement purposes).
32 See 1 JAMES T. O'REniLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DiscLOsuRE § 2:1 (3d ed. 2000).
33 Id. § 2:3, at 12.
34 Id. § 2:3, at 12-13.
35 S. REP. No. 89-813 (1965).
36 112 CONG. REC. 13,661 (1966). Ironically, several speakers who would later have to
deal with FOIA praised Congressman Moss and the Act-including future Secretaries of
Defense and FOIA suit defendants Melvin Laird and Donald Rumsfield, and future President
Gerald Ford who vetoed the 1974 amendments. See 112 CONG. REc. 13,640, 13,654 (1966);
see also O'REiLY, supra note 32, § 2:4, at 14-15.
37 President Johnson felt pressure from news media organizations to sign the bill. Federal
agencies continued to protest against such a bill, and Johnson had his own reservations having
never supported any expansion of public information in his time as senate leader. See
O'REiLY, supra note 32, § 2:4, at 15.
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bill contained rough versions of both exemptions 138 and 7.39
FOIA was amended in 1974 after Watergate's "national security" abuses of
secrecy prompted congressional reform of the broad reach of the (b)(1)
exemption.40 Courts had seemed especially reluctant to involve themselves in
national-security matters and the classification of documents. 41 The amendment
passed overwhelmingly in both the House and Senate,4 2 and while President Ford
vetoed the amendment,43 the Senate overrode the veto.44 The amendment had
some impact on (b)(1) cases. 45
38 The initial form of the (b)(1) exemption gave almost total deference to agency
decisions. See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 81-84 (1973). It also gave the President power to set
the limits on disclosure by issuing an executive order. See Note, Comments on Proposed
Amendments to Section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act: The Freedom of Information
Bill, 40 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 417,445 (1964).
39 For the (b)(7) exemption, drafters initially believed that law enforcement records were
covered under other statutes (such as the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2000), which restricted
discovery rights for criminal defendants) and judicial precedent. See O'REILLY, supra note 32,
§ 17:2, at 90-93. Vigorous federal agency testimony, though, eventually won an exemption for
"investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the extent they are by law
available to a party other than an agency." Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 55 (1967). President
Johnson highlighted the need for protecting investigatory files. See Statement by the President
upon Signing the "Freedom of Information Act," 2 PuB. PAPERS 699 (July 4, 1966).
40 See, e.g., Freedom of Info., Executive Privilege, Secrecy in Gov't: Hearing before the
Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the Comm. on Governmental Operations, 93d
Cong. 20 (1973) (testimony of Courtney Sheldon).
41 See Epstein v. Resor, 421 F.2d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 1970) (stating that "what is desirable
in the interest of national defense and foreign policy is not the sort of question that courts are
designed to deal with."); Wolfe v. Froehlke, 358 F. Supp. 1318, 1320 (D.D.C. 1973), affid, 510
F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1974), ("The realm of foreign relations is as inappropriate for judicial
intervention as is the realm of national security .... "); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 84 (1973)
(The government's burden was only to show the classification and that it was within national
defense and foreign policy range. If it did, "the duty of the District Court under § 552(a)(3)
[ordering public access under FOIA] was.., at an end.").
42 Votes for passage were 383-8 in the House and 64-17 in the Senate. After the veto the
votes were 371-31 in the House and 65-27 in the Senate. See O'REiLLY, supra note 32, § 11:3,
at 510n.21.
43 President Ford worried that allowing courts to make classification decisions was a
separation of powers concern. See Veto of Freedom of Information Act, 10 WEEKLY CoMP.
PRES. Doc. 1318 (Oct. 17, 1974) (The "courts should not be forced to make what amounts to
the initial classification decision in sensitive and complex areas where they have no particular
expertise"; instead, President Ford wanted (b)(1) confidentiality to be preserved if "a reasonable
basis to support [the classification]" could be found by the court.).
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Exemption 7 was also amended in 1974 when Congress sought to promote
more judicial review of law enforcement claims.46 The language was expanded to
its present form, where the federal agency must show that a particular record is
"compiled for law enforcement purposes" and that disclosure would cause one of
the enumerated harms.47 As to be expected from President Ford's veto of the
FOIA amendments, his administration continued to encourage agencies to be
stingy with the release of documents within the congressional mandate.48 The
44 120 CONG. REc. 36,955 (1974). For a thorough discussion on the 1974 amendments,
see Note, National Security and the Amended Freedom of Information Act, 85 YALE L. 401
(1976).
45 Federal agencies realized they could not abuse their exemption power with "manifestly
erroneous" classifications. See Note, supra note 44, at 416. Courts demand greater showings by
the government in some instances. See Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (setting
forth five characteristics for de novo review regarding national security); Weissman v. CIA, 565
F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that an agency can satisfy its burden by showing that proper
classification procedures were followed and the document logically falls into an exempt
category); Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362, 1368 (4th Cir. 1975) (holding that
there is a rebuttable presumption that a (b)(1) claim is exempt if described by an agency as
classifiable and it was "useful, if not vital, to national security"). But often courts were still
hesitant to overrule classification documents. See O'REILLY, supra note 32, § 11:4, at 515.
("The initial cases under the amended Act revealed more pressure against the government's
position, but continued judicial unwillingness to release sensitive data to the public, because of
the potential harms to national security, military, or foreign affairs.")
46 Judicial interpretations tended to be quite deferential to exemption 7 claims. See Larry
P. Ellsworth, Amended Exemption 7 of the Freedom of Information Act, 25 AM. U. L. REV. 37,
42 (1975-76) (mentioning four federal cases that denied disclosure under exemption 7 and
turned congressional "concern into action"). Critics of the exemption had argued for such
changes for years. See, e.g., Ralph Nader, Freedom from Information, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 1 (1970); see also O'REILY, supra note 32, § 17:4, at 97.
47 The 1974 exemption 7 amendments provide:
[Ilnvestigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes [are exempt] only to the
extent that the production of such records would (A) interfere with enforcement
proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication,
(C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a
confidential source and, in the case of a record compiled by a criminal law enforcement
authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful
national security intelligence investigation, confidential information furnished only by the
confidential source, (E) disclose investigative techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger
the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (Supp. V 1975), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1970). Opponents
worried that such an expansion would impair the FBI and its informants. See 120 CONG. REC.
17,039 (1974). This was President Ford's major objection in vetoing the amendments. See Veto
of Freedom of Information Act, supra note 43, at 1318. But Congress was committed to greater
public access and limited government secrecy. See O'REILLY, supra note 32, § 17:4, at 102.
4 8 Edward H. Levi, Attorney General's Memorandum on the 1974 Amendments to the
Freedom of Information Act 4-12 (1975), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/04foia/
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Carter Administration, in contrast, encouraged more openness-but not
zealously.49
FOIA was amended again in 1986, where the (b)(1) exemption was slightly
expanded. Congress created a "terrorist exclusion," allowing government
agencies to avoid telling a requestor whether or not requested records existed. 50
Exemption 1 presently excludes release under the FOIA for matters "specifically
authorized under criteria established by an Executive Order to be kept secret in
the interest of national defense or foreign policy and are in fact properly classified
pursuant to such Executive Order." 51
The (b)(7) exemption enjoyed greater expansion in 1986 in many respects. 52
First, the exemption 7 language had the phrase "investigatory records" changed to
"records or information," so now exemption 7 potentially protects all "records or
74agmemo.htm. See O'REILLY, supra note 32, § 17:4, at 102 n.37 ("This [memorandum] was
more rational... but certainly does some stretching of the congressional intent for the
preservation of secrecy."); see also Ellsworth, supra note 46, at 49 n.50.
49 See O'RELLY, supra note 32, § 11:15, at 530 (stating that Carter personally thought the
FOIA should be used moderately, but recognized the benefits of disclosure).
50 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(c)(3) (2000), added by Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).
In matters of counterintelligence, foreign intelligence, or terrorism, the FBI or CIA is legally
able to respond that there are no records which are subject to the Act. See O'RELLY, supra note
32, § 11:11, at 528. Courts continued to be highly deferential to the government in
exemption (b)(1) cases. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT GUIDE (May
2002), available at www.usdoj.gov/oip/exemptionl.htm (last visited November 21, 2003)
("[C]ourts have generally deferred to agency expertise in national security cases. Indeed, courts
are usually reluctant to substitute their judgment in place of the agency's 'unique insights' in the
areas of national defense and foreign relations.") (citations omitted).
5 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(A), (B).
52 Exemption 7 presently excludes matters from FOIA release if they are:
[R]ecords or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent
that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably
be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a
right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected
to disclose the identity of a confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency
or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis,
and, in the case of a record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement
authority in the course of a criminal investigation or by an agency conducting a lawful
national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source,
(E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or
prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or
prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the
law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any
individual.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7).
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information compiled for law enforcement purposes." 53 Second, apart from
exemption 7(B) and (E), the federal agency no longer had to demonstrate that
disclosure "would" cause the harm described, but rather that disclosure "could
reasonably be expected to" cause the described harm.54
53 Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1802, 100 Stat.
3207, 3207-48 to -49 (1986).
54 Id. § 1802, 100 Stat. at 3207-48 to -49. The adjustment to exempt all "information"
compiled for law enforcement purposes eased the burden for agencies who struggled with the
"investigatory" requirement. Courts might disqualify some sensitive law enforcement
information by requiring "investigatory" files to relate to a specific law enforcement inquiry,
not just a routine monitoring or surveillance. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 50. Compare
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 509 F.2d 527, 529-30 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding
that records merely submitted for monitoring employment discrimination are not
"investigatory"), with Ctr. for Nat'l Policy Review on Race & Urban Issues v. Weinburger, 502
F.2d 370, 373-74 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding that records of an agency review of public schools
suspected of discrimination are "investigatory"). With the amendment, a specifically
enumerated investigation was not needed, as was previously required.
The expansion of only exempting a "record" to any item of "information" was a
codification of the Supreme Court's determination that an item of information originally
obtained by an agency for a law enforcement purpose does not lose exemption (b)(7) protection
because it is maintained or moved to a non-law enforcement record in FBI v. Abramson, 456
U.S. 615, 631-32 (1982) ("We hold that information initially contained in a record made for
law enforcement purposes continues to meet the threshold requirements of Exemption 7 where
that recorded information is reproduced or summarized in a new document prepared for a non-
law-enforcement purpose."). For an extensive discussion on Abramson's impact and its
threshold requirement, see Richard A. Kaba, Note, Threshold Requirements for the FBI Under
Exemption 7 of the Freedom of Information Act, 86 MICH. L. REV. 620, 628-31 (1987) ("If the
FBI can meet this threshold requirement [compiled for law enforcement purposes] and can then
show that one of the six specific harms would occur or 'could reasonably be expected' to occur,
the information is exempt from disclosure under FOIA.").
The second major substantive change to the exemption replaced "would" with "could
reasonably be expected to." Greater deference to the exemption was warranted with the open-
ended language. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of
the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 756 n.9 (1989) (stating that "would constitute" standard alteration to
"could reasonably be expected to constitute" standard "represents a considered congressional
effort to ease considerably a Federal law enforcement agency's burden in invoking [the
exemption]"); see also Edwin Meese, I, Attorney General's Memorandum on the 1986
Amendments to the Freedom of Information Act (Dec. 1987), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/04foia/86agmemo.htm ("This pointed substitution of the phrase 'could
reasonably be expected to' for 'would' in these four exemptions obviously establishes a more
relaxed harm standard to be met by agencies in invoking them, a lesser risk of harm that need
be shown."). The Reagan Administration had worked hard for such adjustments:
The enactment of the Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986 ("FOIA Reform
Act") marks the culmination of many years of administrative and congressional
consideration of the need for such legislative reform. From the beginning, the most
significant driving force behind these efforts was the need for greater law enforcement
protection under the FOIA. In 1981, Federal Bureau of Investigation Director William H.
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B. Reagan Administration Application
While the statutory language of the Act provides the contours of the law, a
presidential administration can have a significant impact on the application of
FOIA and how requests will be handled. The Reagan Administration undoubtedly
Webster testified to the vulnerability of the FBI and other federal law enforcement
agencies to use of the FOIA by sophisticated requesters for purposes of gleaning sensitive
law enforcement information; his testimony demonstrated that the strengthening of the
Act's law enforcement protections was necessary to avoid the impairment of vital law
enforcement interests.
Id. (citations omitted).
The change in language was clearly a welcomed move by law enforcement:
A major easing of the agency's proof can be expected from the addition of the
phrase, can reasonably be expected to, in front of existing exemption language for the
subsets of exemptions covering interference with law enforcement and revelation of
confidential source identities or source-derived information. The strong need for proof in
the case law of the 1974 FOIA exemption (b)(7) led the law enforcement community to
lobby for an easing of the standard. Showing that a reasonable expectation exists will be
far easier than demonstrating effects with greater specificity.
O'REILLY, supra note 32, § 17:5, at 103.
The "law enforcement purposes" language includes both civil and criminal statutes, along
with administrative proceedings. See Rural Hous. Alliance v. USDA, 498 F.2d 73, 81 n.46
(D.C. Cir. 1974) ("[L]aw enforcement purposes... include both civil and criminal
purposes. .. ."); Ctr. for Nat'l Policy Review on Race & Urban Issues v. Weinburger, 502 F.2d
370, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding that administrative findings have the "salient characteristics
of 'law enforcement' contemplated by Exemption 7"); Baltimore Sun v. United States Marshals
Serv., 131 F. Supp. 2d 725, 728 n.2 (D. Md. 2001) (holding that USMS satisfies exemption 7
threshold because USMS is responsible for the "enforcement of civil and criminal seizure and
forfeiture laws"); Youngblood v. Comm'r, No. 2:99-CV-9253-R (RNBX), 2000 WL 852449,
at *10 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2000) (explaining that IRS "investigations or proceedings in the civil
or criminal context" satisfy the exemption 7 threshold); McErlean v. United States Dep't of
Justice, No. 97 CIV. 7831(BSJ), 1999 WL 791680, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1999) ("It is well-
settled that documents compiled by the INS in connection with the administrative proceedings
authorized by the Immigration and Naturalization Act are documents compiled for 'law
enforcement purposes'...."); Johnson v. DEA, No. 97-2231, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9802, at
*9 (D.D.C. June 25, 1998) ("The law being enforced may be... regulatory."). This fact is
relevant regarding post-9/11 requests that could be withheld as a matter of regulatory
investigation by the INS or another administrative agency. Also of considerable significance,
there is no requirement that the law enforcement matter end with an administrative, civil, or
criminal enforcement. See Ponder v. Reno, No. 98-3097, slip op. at 5 (D.D.C. Jan. 22, 2001)
(stating that records were compiled for law enforcement purposes even though the subject was
never prosecuted); Goldstein v. Office of Indep. Counsel, No. CIV. A. 87-2028TPJJM, 1999
WL 570862, at *8-9 (D.D.C. July 29, 1999) (explaining that an investigation of an individual
for criminal violations was for a law enforcement purpose even if the investigation "went
nowhere").
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sought curtailment of FOIA, especially exemption 7.55 The central piece of the
Administration's effort to rework the FOLA exemption 7 was a memorandum by
Attorney General Edwin Meese, 111.56 The lengthy memorandum elaborated on
the exemption 7 expanded language, stated that "all federal agencies should also
reassess the extent to which their records may now qualify for possible exemption
7 protection[,] ' 57 and reinforced the fact that "agencies should be mindful of the
greater latitude that is now inherent in these major law enforcement
exemptions." 58 The Supreme Court expanded law enforcement agencies'
protection even further in 1990, holding that information that may not initially
have been obtained for law enforcement purposes may still qualify under
exemption 7 if it is subsequently compiled for a law enforcement purpose at any
point prior to "when the [g]ovemment invokes the [e]xemption. '59
55 See Statement on signing the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, 2 PuB. PAPERs 1452 (Oct.
27, 1986). President Reagan stated:
This Act contains several important provisions reforming the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) that will considerably enhance the ability of Federal law
enforcement agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Drug
Enforcement Administration, to combat drug offenders and other criminals. My
Administration has been seeking such reforms since 1981.
These FOIA reforms substantially broaden the law enforcement exemptions in that
act, thereby increasing significantly the authority of Federal agencies to withhold sensitive
law enforcement documents in their files. The statutory language changes make clear, for
example, that any Federal law enforcement information relating to pending investigations
or confidential sources may be withheld if its disclosure could reasonably be expected to
cause an identified harm.
Id
56 Meese, supra note 54.
57 Id.
58 Id
59 John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 153 (1989); see also KTVY-TV v.
United States, 919 F.2d 1465, 1469 (10th Cir. 1990) (applying John Doe Agency so information
from a personnel interview conducted before an investigation commenced but later compiled
for law enforcement purposes satisfied exemption 7); Kansi v. United States Dep't of Justice,
11 F. Supp. 2d 42, 44 (D.D.C. 1998) (pointing out that once documents are at some point
assembled for law enforcement purposes, the documents qualify for exemption 7 protection
regardless of there original source). This decision resolved the conflict of lower courts on
whether something originally compiled for another purpose, but subsequently used in a law
enforcement purpose could be protected. Compare Corwell & Moring v. Dep't of Def., 703 F.
Supp. 1004, 1009-10 (D.D.C. 1989) (explaining that solicitation and contract bids may be
protected), with Hatcher v. United States Postal Service, 556 F. Supp. 331, 335 (D.D.C. 1982)
(stating that routine contract negotiation and oversight material is not protected from
disclosure). Compare Gould Inc. v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 688 F. Supp. 689, 691 (D.D.C. 1988)
(explaining that routine audit reports may be protected), with John Doe Corp. v. John Doe
Agency, 850 F.2d 105, 109 (2d Cir. 1988) (stating that routine audit reports are not protected).
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C. Clinton Administration Application
The Clinton Administration sought to curtail the depletion of FOIA
disclosures. 60 With a memorandum written by Attorney General Janet Reno,
6 1
the Clinton Administration promoted greater disclosure and accountability on the
part of the agencies.
The Clinton Administration's greatest FOIA impact, however, may have
been the issuance of Executive Order 12,958.62 The Order, which affects
exemption 1 almost entirely, highlights the fact that information may not be
classified unless its "disclosure... reasonably could be expected to result in
damage to the national security .... ,"63 Courts, though, have continued to struggle
with this language, giving deference to agency expertise and refusing to require
actual articulation of a defined harm by an agency. 64 The Order, however, has no
6 0 After President Clinton stressed that FOIA "is a vital part of the participatory system of
government"; "I am committed to enhancing [FOIA's] effectiveness in my Administration";
and "[o]penness in government is essential to accountability... ", the President departed from
the previous administration's policies, and advocated a new attitude regarding FOIA:
I therefore call upon all Federal departments and agencies to renew their commitment to
the Freedom of Information Act, to its underlying principles of government openness, and
to its sound administration. This is an appropriate time for all agencies to take a fresh look
at their administration of the Act, to reduce backlogs of Freedom of Information Act
requests, and to conform agency practice to the new litigation guidance issued by the
Attorney General, which is attached.
Further, I remind agencies that our commitment to openness requires more than
merely responding to requests from the public. Each agency has a responsibility to
distribute information on its own initiative, and to enhance public access through the use of
electronic information systems. Taking these steps will ensure compliance with both the
letter and spirit of the Act.
William J. Clinton, Memorandum for Heads of Departments and Agencies (Oct. 4, 1993),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/04foia/93_clntmem.htm.
61 See Janet Reno, Memorandum for Heads of Departments and Agencies (Oct. 4, 1993)
[hereinafter Reno Memo], reprinted in LITIGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL OPEN GOVERNMENT
LAws A-35 (Allan R. Adler ed., 20th ed. 1997).
62 Exec. Order No. 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,825 (Apr. 20, 1995).
63 Id. § 1.2(a)(4).
64 See Nat'l Sec. Archive v. CIA, No. 99-1160, slip op. at 8 (D.D.C. July 31, 2000)
("Agencies have more experience in the national security arena than courts do, and therefore
their judgment warrants deference as long as the agency can demonstrate a logical connection
between a withheld document and an alleged harm to national security."); Aftergood v. CIA,
No. 98-2107, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18135, at *9 (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 1999) ("[T]he law does not
require certainty or a showing of harm ...."); id. at *9-10 (suggesting that courts must respect
agency predictions concerning any potential national security harm because predictions "must
always be speculative to some extent").
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presumption of classification in any of the defined categories,65 so any
classification must be made at the discretion of an agency assessing the potential
harm to national security. 66
The Reno Memo clearly altered the Reagan Administration guidelines, under
which an agency could scrutinize FOIA requests and deny requests if there wasa
"substantial legal basis." 67 Under the new standard, an agency was instructed to
"defend the assertion of a FOIA exemption only in those cases where the agency
reasonably foresees that disclosure would be harmful to an interest protected by
that exemption." 68Agencies, thus, were unable to withhold disclosure by
suggesting the information could fall within an exemption,69 and there was to be a
"presumptionof disclosure" with all requests.70
Despite the Clinton Administration's earnest efforts,71 most government
agencies are able to classify material at their discretion and courts continue to be
65 See Exec. Order No. 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. at 19,825. The categories that can be proper
bases for classification under section 1.5 of Executive Order 12,958 are: foreign government
information, vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects, or plans relating to
national security, intelligence activities, sources or methods, cryptology, foreign relations or
foreign activities, confidential sources, military plans, weapons, operations, scientific,
technological, or economic matters relating to national security, and government programs for
safeguarding nuclear materials and facilities. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 50.
66 See O'RELLY, supra note 32, § 11:15, at 529 ("Classification systems are the
procedural framework within which agencies make discretionary choices about what to classify
and at what level of secrecy. Courts accord great deference to the opinions of foreign or military
affairs agencies that disclosure may cause serious security harms or revelation of clandestine
sources.").
67 See Letter of Attorney General William French Smith to All Federal Departments and
Agencies (May 5, 1981), cited in Christopher M. Mason, Note, Developments Under the
Freedom of Information Act-1981, 1982 DuKE L.J. 423,425 n.17 (1982).
68 Reno Memo, supra note 61, at A-35.
69 See Michael M. Lowe, Note, The Freedom of Information Act in 1993-94, 43 DuKE
L.J. 1282, 1314 (1994).
70 Reno Memo, supra note 61, at A-35. The Reno Memo also required that agencies
review their own internal regulations regarding FOIA and provide an annual report to Congress
on their FOIA figures. Id. at A-36.
71 Executive Order 12,958 allows classification determinations to be challenged
within the government. 60 Fed. Reg. 19825, 19830 (April 20, 1995) (referring to section
1.9). The Order also stipulates that material must adhere to the procedural requirements
in order to become classified. Exec. Order No. 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. at 19827-28
(referring to sections 1.6 and 1.7). Additionally, the Order requires that a concise reason
for classification must be stated. and that the declassification date must be specified on
the document. Executive Order 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. at 19,828 (referring to sections
1.7(a)(5) and 1.7(a)(4)). Finally, Executive Order 12,958 provides oversight of
classification decisions by the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel. 60 Fed.
Reg. at 19,839, (referring to 5.4(a)(1)). See O'REILLY, supra note 32, § 11:13, at 528
(describing Executive Order 12,958 as "a pro-disclosure order when compared with its
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extremely deferential to these determinations. 72 The Bush Administration may be
reviewing the Order and considering issuing a new Executive Order.73
IV. The BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S "CHANGES" TO FOLA AFTER
SEPTEMBER 1 ITH
The attitude and position on FOIA requests shifted, whether slightly or
significantly, during the Ford, Carter, Reagan, and Clinton Administrations. It is
speculative as to whether the current Bush Administration would have altered
FOIA guidelines, as some have suggested, had the 9/11 disaster never occurred. 74
predecessors from the Republican administrations that preceded it. The 1995 Order's
terms are more demanding of the agency than the prior orders, so agencies must show
more detail about describing the damage to national security, in order to prevail"); see
also Lowe, supra note 69, at 1313 (pointing out that the President's and Attorney
General's Memos "demonstrated the Clinton administration's desire to instill in federal
agencies a more receptive attitude toward FOIA requests."). But see Paul McMasters,
"FOIA, It's Always There," SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS QUILL (Oct. 1996),
at http://www.spj.org/foia..history.asp ("While praising these developments, [Professor
Jane] Kirtley pointed out that the Clinton administration's record on access is spotted.
The Reporters Committee compiles an annual report on restricting access to government
information. The 1996 report lists hundreds of instances when the public or press was
denied access.").
72 See supra notes 41 and 45; O'REILLY, supra note 32, § 11:12, at 528 ("The government
has won virtually all exemption (b)(1) cases [even during and after the Clinton Administration],
in large part because the executive orders are so readily available to agencies that want to keep
an item secret."); Karen L. Turner, Comment, Convergence of the First Amendment and the
Withholding of Information for the Security of the Nation, 33 MCGEORGE L. REv. 593, 610
(2002) ("[G]ovemment agencies may withhold information for purposes of national security, a
decision often subject to the determination of the agency itself."). McMasters explains:
With a few exceptions, court decisions have tended to favor the point of view of the
agencies, especially in cases involving personal privacy and national security, according to
Harry Hammitt, editor of Access Reports and a long-time chronicler of FOI legislation and
court cases. "The courts always start off their decisions with lip-service about the FOIA
being a disclosure law and that the exemptions should be construed narrowly, then they go
ahead and give away the store to the government," said Hammitt.
McMasters, supra note 71.
73 See William J. Broad, U.S. is Still Selling Reports on Making Biological Weapons, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 13, 2002, at Al (quoting Steven Garfinkel, former Information Security Oversight
Office Director, who reported that a new executive order is under consideration).
74 See Ellen Nakashima, Bush View of Secrecy is Stirring Frustration, WASH. POST, Mar.
3, 2002, at A4 (stating that there was an "[Ashcroft] memo-in the works long before the
terrorist attacks"); Drew Clark, 'Open Records' Advocates Criticize Administration's Strategy,
NAT'L J. TECH. DAILY, Sept. 13, 2002 ("Sean Moulton, senior policy analyst at OMB Watch,
said 'the Bush administration's predisposition for secrecy' existed well before the Sept. 11,
2001, terrorist attacks."); Profile: Bush Administration's Handling of the Release of Information
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As noted earlier, the September 1 lth tragedies changed the world landscape and
emphasis on homeland security in monumental ways.75 The centerpiece of the
Bush Administration's change in the direction of FOIA releases was Attorney
General John Ashcroft's memorandum issued on October 12 [hereinafter
Ashcroft Memo].
A. Attorney General Ashcroft's October 12 Memorandum
The Ashcroft Memo76 was one measure among many to tighten security and
decrease the possibility of sinister use of government information. Of greatest
to Public Interest Groups (NPR News, Mar. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Profile] ("David Vladeck is
the director of the Public Citizen Litigation Group. He says the government began tightening
the flow of information before September 1 lth.").
75 See e.g., supra note 17.
76 John Ashcroft, Memorandum for Heads of All Federal Departments and Agencies (Oct.
12, 2001) [hereinafter Ashcroft Memo], at http://www.usdoj.gov/04foia/011012.htm. The
Ashcroft Memo, in pertinent part, states:
MEMORANDUM FOR HEADS OF ALL FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND
AGENCIES
FROM: John Ashcroft, Attorney General
SUBJECT: The Freedom of Information Act
As you know, the Department of Justice and this Administration are committed to
full compliance with the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000). It is
only through a well-informed citizenry that the leaders of our nation remain accountable to
the governed and the American people can be assured that neither fraud nor government
waste is concealed.
The Department of Justice and this Administration are equally committed to
protecting other fundamental values that are held by our society. Among them are
safeguarding our national security, enhancing the effectiveness of our law enforcement
agencies, protecting sensitive business information and, not least, preserving personal
privacy.
Our citizens have a strong interest as well in a government that is fully functional and
efficient. Congress and the courts have long recognized that certain legal privileges ensure
candid and complete agency deliberations without fear that they will be made public.
Other privileges ensure that lawyers' deliberations and communications are kept private.
No leader can operate effectively without confidential advice and counsel. Exemption 5 of
the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), incorporates these privileges and the sound policies
underlying them.
I encourage your agency to carefully consider the protection of all such values and
interests when making disclosure determinations under the FOIA. Any discretionary
decision by your agency to disclose information protected under the FOIA should be made
only after full and deliberate consideration of the institutional, commercial, and personal
privacy interests that could be implicated by disclosure of the information.
In making these decisions, you should consult with the Department of Justice's Office
of Information and Privacy when significant FOIA issues arise, as well as with our Civil
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significance in the memo is that it trumps the Reno Memo of 1993,77 and
establishes a "sound legal basis" standard needed to defend the withholding of
information in a FOIA request.78 It also urges each agency to consider the "values
and interests" 79 of protecting our "fundamental values," 80 an implicit reference to
homeland protection. While the Justice Department has recognized this
memorandum as a shift in overall FOIA policy,81 the statutory language has not
changed.
This new FOIA standard, bearing close resemblance to the Reagan
Administration's standard of a "substantial legal basis", 82 has been sharply
criticized. Many members of the media, legal scholars, and advocacy groups have
complained that the Bush Administration is being much too secretive in
disclosure requests and not living up to the obligations of FOIA.83 One group
Division on FOIA litigation matters. When you carefully consider FOIA requests and
decide to withhold records, in whole or in part, you can be assured that the Department of
Justice will defend your decisions unless they lack a sound legal basis or present an
unwarranted risk of adverse impact on the ability of other agencies to protect other
important records.
This memorandum supersedes the Department of Justice's FOIA Memorandum of
October 4, 1993, and it likewise creates no substantive or procedural right enforceable at
law.
Id. Such policy decisions must be made public per 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(B).
77 See James V. Grimaldi, At Justice, Freedom Not to Release Information, WASH. POST,
Dec. 2, 2002, at El ("It is not that the Reno Justice Department was particularly enamored with
FOIA. But at least attorneys didn't have carte blanch to disregard the law [as Mr. Grimaldi
suggests they do under the Ashcroft Memo].").
78 Ashcroft Memo, supra note 76, para. 5.
79 1d. at para. 4.
80 Id. at para. 2.
81 See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 50, at 4 ("The Ashcroft FOIA Memorandum
establishes a 'sound legal basis' standard .... Under this new standard, agencies should reach
the judgment that their use of a FOIA exemption is on sound footing, both factually and legally,
whenever they withhold requested information."); see also Timothy W. Maier, Bush Team
Thumbs its Nose at FOA, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, Apr. 29, 2002, at 20 ("'[The Ashcroft Memo
is] an indication to agencies to be more aggressive in denying FOIA requests and not be
concerned about going to court,' says American University Washington College of Law
Professor Robert Vaughn.").
82 See Letter of Attorney General William French Smith, supra note 67; see also Harry
Hammitt, The Freedom of Information Center Turning Back the Hands of Time, at
http://foi.rfissouri.edu/terrorismfoi/tumingbk.htnl (last updated Nov. 20, 2001) ("While
heightened national security and law enforcement interests stemming from the Sept. 11 terrorist
attack are implicit in the substance of the [Ashcroft] memo, it was in preparation before that
time and reflects a movement back to the policy of the Reagan administration.").
83 See The Reporter's Committee for Freedom of the Press, Homefront Confidential: How
the War on Terrorism Affects Access to Information and the Public's Right to Know, at
http://www.rcfp.org/homefrontconfidential/foi.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2003) (ranking FOI as
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spokesman suggested, "The Bush administration is mounting the most sustained
assault on open government since the early Reagan administration or perhaps
even since President Gerald Ford vetoed the FOIA amendments in 1974."84
"severe[ly]" threatened by anti-terrorism measures); Turner, supra note 72, at 610-11 (stating
that the Ashcroft Memo places additional considerations for a FOIA request which are not
delineated in the statutory language which "is in direct conflict with the stated purpose of the
Act"); Nakashima, supra note 74, at A4 ("[U]nder FOIA, the 36-year-old cornerstone law for
government transparency, the reluctance to provide information has become routine throughout
the administration, liberal and conservative public interest groups say. They say it is a gathering
trend, fed by, but not rooted in, the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks."); Maier, supra note 81, at 20
("The [Ashcroft] memorandum created a level of secrecy unsurpassed since FOIA became law
in 1966."); John Giuffo, The FOIA Fight, Columbia Journalism Review Online Report
(reporting that more limited disclosure was the subject of several panel discussions in
Philadelphia in March 2002), at http://www.cjr.org/year/02/2/giuffoFOIA.asp (last visited Oct.
3, 2003).
The Administration has also issued Executive Order 13,233, which enhances executive
privilege and blocks public access to federal records created during the administration-another
act which has diminished the public's access to federal documents. Exec. Order No. 13,233, 66
Fed. Reg. 56,025 (Nov. 5, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2001/11/20011101-12.html); See Marcy Lynn Karin, Note, Out of Sight, But Not Out of Mind:
How Executive Order 13,233 Expands Executive Privilege While Simultaneously Preventing
Access to Presidential Records, 55 STAN. L. REv. 529 (2002) (making a critical evaluation of
the Order, suggesting that the legislative and judicial branches are better suited to decide
executive privilege matters than the executive).
84 Maier, supra note 81, at 20 (quoting Tom Blanton, director of the nonpartisan National
Security Archives at George Washington University). Many other organizations, journalists,
and scholars have agreed with such criticisms:
You have an administration that is harkening back to the Nixon era, which believes
that they should not be transparent at all, that things should be secret, they should be
hidden. And while there may be some argument to be secret when it comes to fighting
terrorism, there's no argument to be made when it comes to formulating energy policy
[regarding the controversy over information related to the energy task force, led by Vice
President Cheney].
Profile, supra note 74 (quoting Larry Klayman of "Judicial Watch"); see also Laura Parker et
al., Secure Often Means Secret.- Post-9/11, Government Stingy with Information, USA TODAY,
May 16, 2002, at 1A ("[S]ince the terrorist attacks Sept. 11, the Bush administration has moved
more quickly than any administration since World War 11 to make government activities,
documents and other information secret, liberals and conservatives say."); Press Release,
Society of Professional Journalists, SPJ Asks Ashcroft Not to Stonewall Requests for Public
Information (Oct. 19, 2001), available at http://www.spj.org/news.asp?ref=41. The press
release reported:
[Society of Professional Journalists] leaders sent Ashcroft a letter expressing alarm over a
memorandum he issued this week.
In the letter, SPJ said that it supports keeping government records secret when the threat is
credible and the link to the information is clear. However, in Ashcroft's statement, SPJ
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The Ashcroft Memo affirms that the administration is "committed to full
compliance with the Freedom of Information Act," but the thrust of the entire
Memo is that the interests of disclosure and open government must be balanced
with the "other fundamental values that are held by our society," namely public
protection.85 While academics, advocacy groups, and the press express outrage at
the recent measures to curtail transparent government, the general public is not
that concerned. 86 President Bush's approval ratings have remained high since
9/11, so his constituents seem pleased with his decisions and the overall
atmosphere the Administration has set.87 The White House has pointed out that
the press's outlook and the public's outlook on the matter are not congruent. 88
The "sound legal basis" standard, while a shift from the language of the Reno
Memo, has not thrown FOIA to the four winds. The Bush Administration has the
very difficult task of promoting homeland protection while not offending the
sacred principles of our democracy.89 The Ashcroft Memo, like all Attorney
General memos, may be a shift in policy for our current environment, but the
said the attorney general alluded to purposeful stonewalling and delay in obtaining public
information.
Id.
85 Ashcroft Memo, supra note 76, para. 2.; see also supra notes 15 and 16 and
accompanying text concerning how open government must be balanced with the interests of
protection.
86 See Mark Tapscott, Too Many Secrets, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2002, at A25. In his
article, Mr. Tapscott stated:
Admittedly, insisting that the public's business be done in public isn't a popular cause
these days. Recent surveys show that many Americans are willing to trade significant
chunks of their First Amendment rights for the promise of greater security in the war on
terrorism. Such surveys must gladden the hearts of Bush administration officials ....
Id.
87 See, e.g., Gallup Org., Gallup Poll: Bush Approval Rating Stabilizes at 63%, Jun. 20,
2003, available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr030620.asp (putting Bush's approval
rating at 63 percent). This website gives a chronological history of the President's approval
rating, showing that his highest approval rating was 90% in September of 2001, and his lowest
was 57% in February 2003. See id.
88 See Maier, supra note 81, at 20.
White House spokesman Ari Fleischer has responded to press complaints about
the growing secrecy by saying that the media are not on the same page as the public.
'The press is asking a lot of questions that I suspect the American people would
prefer not to be asked or answered,' he said.
Id.
89 See supra notes 15 and 16 and accompanying text.
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guidelines and spirit of FOIA have not been diminished.90 It must be bore in mind
that most who write about the status of FOIA, namely the press and advocacy
groups, often have a built-in bias toward greater disclosure. It is difficult to get an
objective opinion on whether there has been an actual tightening down of FOIA
releases. On one side the press is writing that secrecy has increased. 91 On the
other side, the government, who will obviously defend its own policies, says that
there has been little change and that it is still completely complying with FOIA.92
The Bush Administration has made a policy move that is quite defensible and
should be deferred to during this volatile time of combating terrorism, dealing
with Iraq, and overall Middle East turbulence.
B. Chief of Staff Card's March 19th Memo
The other major piece of policy formulation to come out of the executive
branch regarding the FOIA was a memorandum issued by White House Chief of
Staff Andrew Card [hereinafter Card Memo], 93 along with the attached guidance
90 Former Head of the Information Security Oversight Office, Steven Garfinkel, stated:
Oh, the memo didn't change the rules. The law stayed the same, and those are
basically the rules. The memo just deals with whether or not the Justice Department is
going to support you in particular cases, and I found that that's largely rhetoric. If you have
a good case, the Justice Department will support you. And you should be inclined to
comply with the law and release information unless there's a very good reason not to.
Profile, supra note 74.; see also The Reporter's Committee for Freedom of the Press, supra
note 83 ("Dan Metcalfe, co-director of the Justice department's Office of Information and
Privacy, said the change in instructions from Reno to Ashcroft did not represent a 'drastic' shift
in the government's FOI policies as many have claimed.").
91 See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
92 See supra note 90 and accompanying text. It is also implicit in the Ashcroft Memo,
supra note 76, that FOIA is still being completely complied with.
93 The relevant portions of White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card's March 19, 2002,
memorandum are included [hereinafter Card Memo]:
At the request of the Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, we have prepared
this memorandum to provide guidance for reviewing Government information regarding
weapons of mass destruction, as well as other information that could be misused to harm
the security of our nation or threaten public safety. It is appropriate that all federal
departments and agencies consider the need to safeguard such information on an ongoing
basis and also upon receipt of any request for records containing such information that is
made under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000). Consistent
with existing law and policy, the appropriate steps for safeguarding such information will
vary according to the sensitivity of the information involved and whether the information
currently is classified.
I. Classified Information
If the information currently is classified and is equal to or less than 25 years old, it
should remain classified in accordance with Executive Order 12958, Sec. 1.5 and Sec. 1.6.
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on March 19, 2002. The Card Memo contained the Acting Director of the
Information Security Oversight Office and the Co-Directors of the Justice
Department's Office of Information and Privacy's prepared guidance regarding
Although classified information generally must be declassified within 10 years of its
original classification, classification or reclassification may be extended for up to 25 years
in the case of information that could reasonably be expected to "reveal information that
would assist in the development or use of weapons of mass destruction." Id., Sec.
1.6(d)(2).
If the information is more than 25 years old and is still classified, it should remain
classified in accordance with Executive Order 12958, Sec. 3.4(b)(2), which authorizes
agency heads to exempt from automatic declassification any "specific information, the
release of which should be expected to... reveal information that would assist in the
development or use of weapons of mass destruction."
II. Previously Unclassified or Declassified Information
If the information, regardless of age, never was classified and never was disclosed to
the public under proper authority, but it could reasonably be expected to assist in the
development or use of weapons of mass destruction, it should be classified in accordance
with Executive Order 12958, Part 1, subject to the provisions of Sec. 1.8(d) if the
information has been the subject of an access demand (or Sec 6.1(a) if the information
concerns nuclear or radiological weapons).
If such sensitive information, regardless of age, was classified and subsequently was
declassified, but it never was disclosed to the public under proper authority, it should be
reclassified in accordance with Executive Order 12958, Part 1, subject to the provisions of
Sec. 1.8(d) if the information has been the subject of an access demand (or Sec 6.1 (a) if the
information concerns nuclear or radiological weapons).
[I. Sensitive But Unclassified Information
In addition to information that could reasonably be expected to assist in the
development or use of weapons of mass destruction, which should be classified or
reclassified as described in Parts I and 11 above, departments and agencies maintain and
control sensitive information related to America's homeland security that might not meet
one or more of the standards for classification set forth in Part 1 of Executive Order 12958.
The need to protect such sensitive information from inappropriate disclosure should be
carefully considered, on a case-by-case basis, together with the benefits that result from the
open and efficient exchange of scientific, technical, and like information.
All departments and agencies should ensure that in taking necessary and appropriate
actions to safeguard sensitive but unclassified information related to America's homeland
security, they process any Freedom of Information Act request for records containing such
information in accordance with the Attorney General's FOIA Memorandum of October
12, 2001, by giving full and careful consideration to all applicable FOIA exemptions....
As the accompanying memorandum from the Assistant to the President and Chief of
Staff indicates, federal departments and agencies should not hesitate to consult with the
Office of Information and Privacy, either with general anticipatory questions or on a case-
by-case basis as particular matters arise, regarding any FOIA-related homeland security
issue.
Card Memo (March 19, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/
2002foiapost10.htm.
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information release. The main themes were actions to be taken with classified
information and "sensitive but unclassified information." 94
Regarding classified information, the Card Memo reaffirms the classification
policies that were articulated in Executive Order 12,958 under the Clinton
Administration, but extends some of the classification status within the
parameters of what the Order allowed.95 There seems to be less controversy
concerning these decisions, since they relate to weapons of mass destruction and
have a more defined connection to national security. Of greater concern is that
"departments and agencies maintain and control sensitive information related to
America's homeland security"96 even if the information cannot be clearly
protected under Executive Order 12,958.97 This stance seems to allow agencies to
make their own determinations of what is too "sensitive" for release.
98
Anytime there is a term or phrase that must be interpreted, there can be cause
for concern. The "sensitive but unclassified" declaration, however, is not out of
line with the spirit of FOIA considering present security concerns. FOIA offices,
most importantly those in the Justice Department, have agency expertise on what
subjects are "sensitive" and what are not.99 There will be borderline cases, and
this new guidance seems to indicate that those situations may favor non-
disclosure, but such a conclusion is justified because the administration must take
steps to deter the threat of terrorism. 100 If, in the estimation of the government
94 Id.
95 Notably, information that is more than twenty-five years old, which would have been
subject to automatic declassification, should remain classified if it could reasonably be used to
produce weapons of mass destruction, and information that was previously declassified but
never released to public should be reclassified if it could reasonably be expected to assist to
create weapons of mass destruction. Exec. Order 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,825, at 19,833,
19,829 (Apr. 20, 1995) (referring to sections 3.4(b)(2) and 1.8(d), respectively).
96 Card Memo, supra note 93.
97 See supra note 95.
98 See Clark, supra note 74 (voicing concerns about the Card Memo, "The 'sensitive'
standard is not defined by FOIA and hence is subject to widely varying interpretations.... 'A
more precise and definitive approach' is necessary' said Sean Moulton, senior policy analyst at
OMB Watch).
99 For a listing of FOIA offices at all federal agencies, see http://www.usdoj.gov/
04foia/foiacontacts.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2003).
100The Homeland Security Advisory System, a means to disseminate information
regarding the risk of terrorist acts, has oscillated between a rating of "Elevated" and "High." For
the current threat level, see http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland; see also, e.g., Ashcroft,
Ridge, Mueller Announce Threat-level Increase (Feb. 7, 2003), at http://www.cnn.con2003/
US/02/07/threat.wanscript/index.html (pointing out that the decision to increase the threat level
to "high" was based on "specific intelligence received and analyzed by the full intelligence
community" and that the "al Qaeda terrorist network [is] still determined to attack innocent
Americans ....").
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agencies, some information is too sensitive, they should have the means to
withhold it from being disclosed.
V. AN INITIAL CASE STUDY: CENTER FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES V.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE
One of the first cases to deal with post-9/11 FOIA issues was the D.C.
Circuit's Center for National Security Studies v. United States Department of
Justice, decided on June 17, 2003.101 In this case, the plaintiffs sought disclosure
under FOIA for the names and circumstances of individuals detained after the
September 1 lth terrorist attacks, while the Department of Justice asserted the
requested information to be exempt under exemption 7.102 It is an immensely
significant case because it indicates a shift toward greater judicial deference
regarding FOIA requests with the post-9/11 emphasis on homeland security.
A. Factual Background
The plaintiffs in the case were the Center for National Security Studies, the
American Civil Liberties Union, and twenty-one other public interest
organizations. 10 3 After the government did not voluntarily release the
information, the plaintiffs made a FOIA request on October 29, 2001, asking for:
(1) the identities of each detainee (including circumstances of detention and any
charges brought against them), 104 (2) the identities of any of the individual
detainees' lawyers, 105 (3) the identities of courts that have been requested to enter
101 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies II, to distinguish
it from the district court decision of the same name]. The district court for the District of
Columbia is the one court that always has jurisdiction to enjoin FOIA denials; other courts withjurisdiction would be where the complainant resides, has principal place of business, or where
the agency records reside. See 5 U.S. C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2000).
102 Ctr.forNat'l Sec. Studies 11, 331 F.3d at 922.
103 Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. Dep't of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94, 95 (D.D.C. 2002)
[hereinafter Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies I, to distinguish it from the appellate court decision]. The
other plaintiffs included: Electronic Privacy Information Center, American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Committee, American Immigration Law Foundation, American Immigration
Lawyers Association, Amnesty International USA, Arab-American Institute, Asian-American
Legal Defense and Education Fund, Center for Constitutional Rights, Center for Democracy
and Technology, Council on American Islamic Relations, First Amendment Foundation,
Human Rights Watch, Multiracial Activist, Nation Magazine, National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers, National Black Police Association, Inc., Partnership for Civil Justice, Inc.,
People for the American Way Foundation, Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, and
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orders sealing proceedings of the individual detainees, 10 6 and (4) all policy
directives issued to federal officials on disclosure about the detainees or about the
sealing of proceedings. 10 7 The FBI responded to the request by stating that all of
the material would be withheld pursuant to exemption 7 of FOIA; upon the initial
agency appeal, the FBI affirmed its denial under exemptions 7(A), 7(C), and
7(F). 108
Those arrested and detained fell into one of three categories: (1) immigration-
related charges by the INS, (2) persons charged with federal crimes, and
(3) persons held on material witness warrants. 109 For the over 700 individuals
held on immigration charges, the government revealed place of birth and
citizenship for most of them,110 but withheld their names, dates and locations of
detention or arrest, dates of release, and names of lawyers. 111 One-hundred thirty-
four individuals were detained on federal criminal charges. 112 Although many of
the convictions could have been described as "terrorism-related crimes," only one
detainee was connected to the September l1th attacks. 113 The government
released most of the information on these detainees, but withheld information on
the dates and locations of arrest along with dates and locations of detention. 11
4
The government withheld all information regarding those held as material
witnesses. 115 Regarding the request for policy directives, the government
provided only two documents (one heavily redacted). 116 Importantly, the D.C.
106 Id.
107 Id.
10 8 Id. at 98. The exemptions cover:
[R]ecords of information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent
that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably
be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings ... (C) could reasonably be
expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy... (F) could
reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (2000).
109 Ctr.for Nat'l Sec. Studies II, 331 F.3d at 921.
110 Ctr.forNat'l Sec. Studies 1, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 97.
111 Ctr.for Nat'l Sec. Studies II, 331 F.3d at 922.
1121d. at 921.
113 Id. The one individual charged in connection with the September 11th attacks was
Zaccharias Moussaoui. See Ctr.for Nat'l Sec. Studies , 215 F. Supp. 2d at 98 n.6; see also Jerry
Markon, VA Appeals Court May Surprise in Terror Case; Despite Pro-Government,
Conservative Reputation, Moussaoui Panel Could Go Either Way, WASH. POST, June 5, 2003,
at A16 ("Moussaoui was charged in December 2001 with conspiring with al Qaeda members to
hijack the airplanes that crashed into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.").
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Circuit noted that "each of the detainees has had access to counsel, access to
courts, and freedom to contact the press or the public at large." 117
B. Court Discussion and Conclusions
The district court held that the government must release the identifies of the
individuals detained and the detainees' lawyers.' 1 8 It did not believe that the
government had established the "rational link" between disclosure and the alleged
harms.119 The government, in the district court's view, only speculated that the
detainees could be connected to terrorist activities and, as such, requested an
untenable stretch of the exemption's coverage.120
1. Majority Opinion: Considerable Deference
The D.C. Circuit reversed the lower court's order that the names must be
disclosed, and concluded that: (1) the government could withhold the identities of
the individuals detained,121 (2) the government could properly withhold the dates
and locations of arrest, detention, and release, 122 and (3) the government could
withhold the identities of the detainees' lawyers.123
As a threshold issue, the court quickly noted that the information under
question was definitely compiled for law enforcement purposes, so the
exemption 7 subparts would apply. 124 Since the court concluded the
117 Ctr.forNat'l Sec. Studies I1, 331 F.3d at 922.
118 Ctr.forNat'l Sec. Studies , 215 F. Supp. 2d at 113-14.
119Md, at 102. The district court cited Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms, 789 F.2d 64, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1986) for the need of such a "rational link." "Therefore, in
the absence of an allegation of 'reasonable specificity' that detainees have a connection to
terrorism, the Government's concern that disclosure would deter cooperation and impair its
investigation is pure speculation, and, with respect to the INS detainees, is actually belied by the
record." Id. at 103.
120 Id. at 102. The court forcefully noted:
[TIhe Court has uncovered no FOIA case that would permit the Government to do what it
wants to do here: withhold information simply because of the possibility, however remote,
that the detainees (even those who have been released) have information that might, at a
later date, aid the Government's intelligence gathering and law enforcement efforts.
Id. at 102 n.12.
121 Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies II, 331 F.3d at 932.
122 Id. at 933.
123 Id. at 932-33.
124 Id. at 926. "The names have been compiled for the 'law enforcement purpose' of
successfully prosecuting the terrorism investigation. As compiled, they constitute a
1630 [Vol. 64:1605
FREEDOM OF INFORMATIONACTIN POST-9/1 1 WORLD
exemption 7(A) subpart sufficient for withholding the information, it did not
analyze the 7(C) or 7(F) sections at all. 125
The overwhelming theme that runs throughout the D.C. Circuit Court's
opinion is one of deference to law enforcement agencies' judgment regarding the
potential harm of releasing the requested identities.126 When beginning the
consideration of whether disclosure would "reasonably be expected to interfere
with enforcement proceedings[,]' 127 the court stated it is "well-established that
the judiciary owes some measure of deference to the executive in cases
implicating national security, a uniquely executive purview." 128 The court then
invoked Supreme Court precedent for this principle, 129 as well as its own
previous FOIA cases. 130 It should be noted that the Federal District Court for the
District of Columbia and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals handle the highest
number of FOIA appeals concerning federal agencies because the statute provides
the district jurisdiction for an appeal of a denial by a defendant agency. 131
comprehensive diagram of the law enforcement investigation after September 11. Clearly this is
information compiled for law enforcement purposes." Id.
125 Id. at 925.
126 E.g., id. at 926 ("The government's declarations, viewed in light of the appropriate
deference to the executive on issues of national security, satisfy this burden.") In the majority's
opinion, the word "deference" is explicitly used seventeen times, and is referenced as a concept
throughout as well.
127 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) (2000).
128 Ctr.forNat'l Sec. Studies II, 331 F.3d at 926-27.
129 Id. at 927 (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001)) (" '[T]errorism or
other special circumstances' might warrant 'heightened deference to the judgments of the
political branches' "); Dep't of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988) ("[C]ourts traditionally
have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national
security affairs"); CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 179 (1985) ("[The decisions of the [CIA]
Director, who must of course be familiar with 'the whole picture,' as judges are not, are worthy
of great deference given the magnitude of the national security interests and potential risks at
stake.").
130 Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies II, 331 F.3d at 927 ("We have consistently reiterated the
principle of deference to the executive in the FOIA context when national security concerns are
implicated."). The court cited several cases to substantiate this point: King v. United States
Dep't of Justice, 830 F.2d 210, 217 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("[T]he court owes substantial weight to
detailed agency explanations in the national security context"); McGehee v. Casey, 718' F.2d
1137, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (" '[T]he Executive departments[,] responsible for national defense
and foreign policy matters[,] have unique insights into what adverse affects [sic] might occur as
a result of a particular classified record.' "(quoting S. Rep. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12,
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6267)); Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d 1100, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("Once
satisfied that proper procedures have been followed and that the information logically falls into
the exemption claimed, the courts need not go further to test the expertise of the agency, or to
question its veracity when nothing appears to raise the issue of good faith.").
131 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2000).
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The court was quite sensitive to the national-security context and terrorism
threat, 132 and this perspective seemed to drive its entire outlook on deferring to
the government. The government sought and succeeded to justify withholding
disclosure because of the threat that terrorist organizations would intimidate
witnesses and would be able to see how the investigation was being conducted. 133
Such alleged harms were based on the affidavits of two federal terrorism
specialists.134 The court made the important point that whether the information
"'could reasonably be expected' [to interfere with enforcement proceedings]" was
ultimately a "predictive judgment" that either the agency or the court would have
to make. 135 With this in mind, the court believed that this situation called for
deference, stating that it was "abundantly clear that the government's top
counterterrorism officials are well-suited to make this predictive judgment.
Conversely, the judiciary is in an extremely poor position to second-guess the
executive's judgment in this area of national security."'136 The court was
ultimately compelled to decide that disclosure of the detainees' names would
reasonably interfere with the investigation. 137 Likewise, the assertions of witness
intimidation also justified withholding of the names. 138
132 Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies II, 331 F.3d at 928 ("America faces an enemy just as real as
its former Cold War foes, with capabilities beyond the capacity of the judiciary to explore.").
133 Ctr.for Nat'l Sec. 1, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 101-03.
134 Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies II, 331 F.3d at 923 ("In support of its motion, the
government submitted affidavits from James Reynolds, Director of the Terrorism and Violent
Crime Section of the Department of Justice, and Dale Watson, FBI Executive Assistant
Director for Counterterrorism--officials with central responsibility for the ongoing terrorist
investigation."). The dissent highlights the fact that the Watson affidavit was prepared for other
cases, dealing with closing deportation hearings, and that the harm discussed there was the
release of evidence, not names. Id. at 941. Though the issue is not identical, the Watson
declaration on the threat of publicly releasing information invokes the same principle and
served a useful purpose for as much as the court wanted to reference it. For further discussion
on the requirements concerning government affidavits for FOIA exemptions, see Edmonds v.
FBI, 272 F. Supp. 2d 35, 44-45.
135 Ctr.for Nat'l Sec. Studies II, 331 F.3d at 928.
136 Id. (referencing Krikorian v. Dep't of State, 984 F.2d 461, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
("Judges... lack the expertise necessary to second-guess such agency opinions in the typical
national security FOIA case.")).
137 Id. Specifically, the court believed that:
A complete list of names informing terrorists of every suspect detained by the government
at any point during the September I investigation would give terrorist organizations a
composite picture of the government investigation, and since these organizations would
generally know the activities and locations of its members on or about September 11,
disclosure would inform terrorists of both the substantive and geographic focus of the
investigation. Moreover, disclosure would inform terrorists which of their members were
compromised by the investigation, and which were not. This information could allow
terrorists to better evade the ongoing investigation and more easily formulate or revise
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In order to allow the government to withhold the names, the court had to
wrestle with the proper application of the "mosaic theory" to this exemption 7
setting. 139 The "mosaic" argument has commonly been persuasive with courts in
the exemption 1 context, but never in exemption 7 cases 140 -a fact of which the
counter-efforts. In short, the "records could reveal much about the focus and scope of the
[agency's] investigation, and are thus precisely the sort of information exemption 7(A)
allows an agency to keep secret." (quoting Swan v. SEC, 96 F.3d 498, 500 (D.C. Cir.
1996)).
Id. at 928.
138 Id. at 929. The court stated that "[o]n numerous occasions, both the Supreme Court
and this Court have found government declarations expressing the likelihood of witness
intimidation and evidence tampering sufficient to justify withholding of witnesses' names under
Exemption 7(A)." Id. at 929 (citing NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 239-
42 (1978); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. EPA, 856 F.2d 309, 312-13 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
Mapother v. Dep't of Justice, 3 F.3d 1533, 1542-43 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Manna v. United States
Dep't of Justice 51 F.3d 1158, 1165 (3d Cir. 1995); and Swan v. SEC 96 F.3d 498, 499-500
(D.C. Cir. 1996)).
139 As the district court described it, the "mosaic theory":
[A]rgues that no information may be disclosed because "bits and pieces of information that
may appear innocuous in isolation, when assimilated with other information... will allow
the organization to build a picture of the investigation and to thwart the government's
attempts to investigate and prevent terrorism."
Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies L 215 F. Supp. 2d at 103 (citations omitted); see also O'REILLY,
supra note 32, § 11:17, at 531 (describing the "jigsaw puzzle" argument).
140 Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies I, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 103 (citing, Abbotts v. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, 766 F.2d 604 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). Just a month before the D.C. Circuit
reversed its decision in Center for National Security Studies, the D.C. District Court stated "It
should be noted that this 'special deference' to the agency's affidavits is unique to Exemption
1." ACLU v. Dep't of Justice, 265 F. Supp. 2d 20, 30 (D.D.C. 2003) (citations omitted).
Interestingly, the district court stated that since exemption 1 cases receive "considerable
deference" from courts, it was quite significant that the government did not rely on exemption
1. Ctr.forNat'l Sec. Studies , 215 F. Supp. 2d at 103. Regarding exemption 1 mosaic claims:
The nature of the intelligence business is to cumulate fragments from which useful
conclusions may be drawn. So an agency can dress up a seemingly innocuous piece of
data with the jigsaw argument, to protect it under the classification standards of the
executive order.
Analysts of bits of data into a "mosaic" by skilled intelligence agents who may
receive FOIA-released documents is a phenomenon which the courts accept as a basis for
withholding of even fragmentary information [including the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia].
O'REiLLY, supra note 32. § 11:17, at 532 (citations omitted). See Nat'l Sec. Archive v. FBI,
759 F. Supp. 872, 877 (D.D.C. 1991).
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dissent made a significant point.141 The court invoked an unprecedented level of
deference in extending the "mosaic theory" to exemption 7:
Just as we have deferred to the executive when it invokes FOIA Exemptions 1
and 3, we owe the same deference under Exemption 7(A) in appropriate cases,
such as this one. Plaintiffs provide no valid reason why the general principle of
deference to the executive on national security issues should apply under FOIA
Exemption 3, as in Sims and Halperin, and Exemption 1, as in our earlier cases,
but not under Exemption 7(A). Nor can we conceive of any reason to limit
deference to the executive in its area of expertise to certain FOIA exemptions so
long as the government's declarations raise legitimate concerns that disclosure
would impair national security.
142
The majority believed that the principle of deference should not be limited in such
a wooden fashion: "Judicial deference depends on the substance of the danger
posed by disclosure-that is, harm to the national security-not the FOIA
exemption invoked."' 143
In displaying such considerable deference to the executive agencies, the
Center for National Security Studies majority seemed reassured by other circuits'
holdings that appreciated the present homeland security situation and have,
accordingly, deferred to the expertise of the executive branch. 144 Of special note
141 Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies II, 331 F.3d at 939 (Tatel, J., dissenting) ("[W]e have never
held that such heightened deference [to the government assertions in exemption 1 and 3 cases]
is also appropriate in Exemption 7 cases.").
142 Id. at 927-28 (citations omitted). The court drew strength from CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S.
159 (1985), where the Supreme Court
cautioned that "bits and pieces" of data "may aid in piecing together bits or other
information even when the individual piece is not of obvious importance in itself." Thus,
"what may seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great moment to one who has a
broad view of the scene and may put the questioned item of information in its proper
context."
Id. at 178. The court also cited its own precedent from United States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617, 623
(D.C. Cir. 1989) ("Things that did not make sense to the District Judge would make all too
much sense to a foreign counter-intelligence specialist who could learn much about this nation's
intelligence-gathering capabilities from what these documents revealed about sources and
methods."). Ctr.forNat'l Sec. Studies II, 331 F.3d at 929. The court held that such a danger was
present in the current national security context. Id.
143 Id. at 928.
144 Id. at 932 ("In upholding the government's invocation of Exemption 7(A), we observe
that we are in accord with several federal courts that have wisely respected the executive's
judgment in prosecuting the national response to terrorism." (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfield, 316
F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003); Global Relief Found. v. O'Neill, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002); Hamdi
v. Rumsfield, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002)). The notable exception to this trend is the Sixth
Circuit in Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002), discussed infra at notes
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was North Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 145 wherein the Third Circuit refused
to probe intensely into the government's assertions, instead deferring to the
government's expertise in recognizing a potential threat, in holding that the
government may close deportation hearings. 146 Though these are not FOIA cases,
they reflect the attitude of increased deference by courts to federal agencies in the
matters of national security-thus, giving more leeway to FOIA exemptions 1
and/or 7 is not an anomaly.
In keeping with its theme of deference, the court held that the names of the
detainees' attorneys could be withheld under exemption 7 because of the
possibility that releasing the attorneys' information could lead to the development
of a comprehensive list of all the detainees-the chief evil to be avoided. 147 The
court "easily affirmed" the district court's ruling regarding the dates and locations
of arrest, which were perhaps the most threatening pieces of information.148
The court also rejected plaintiff's claims of a First Amendment or common
law right to disclosure of the detainees' names. In regard to the First Amendment,
the court held that while there is a limited right of access to a criminal judicial
proceeding, 149 that right does not extend to investigatory documents. 150 The court
191-201 and accompanying text. The Center for National Security Studies majority simply
stated it "[did] not find the Sixth Circuit's reasoning compelling.... Ctr.forNat'l Sec. Studies
II, 331 F.3d at 932.
145 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002). As the Center for National Security Studies majority
highlighted:
That court acknowledged that the representations of the Watson Declaration are to some
degree speculative. But the court did not search for specific evidence that each of the INS
detainees was involved in terrorism, nor did it embark on a probing analysis of whether the
government's concerns were well-founded. Rather, it was "quite hesitant to conduct a
judicial inquiry into the credibility of these security concerns, as national security is an area
where courts have traditionally extended great deference to Executive expertise. The court
concluded: To the extent that the Attorney General's national security concerns seem
credible, we will not lightly second-guess them. We think the Third Circuit's approach
was correct and we follow it here.
Ctr.forNat'l Sec. Studies II, 331 F.3d at 932 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
146 N. Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2002).
147 Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies II, 331 F.3d at 933. The court reasoned:
[I]f such a list [of detainees, compiled after knowledge of their attorneys] fell into the
hands of a Qaeda, the consequences could be disastrous. Having accepted the
government's predictive judgments about the danger of disclosing a comprehensive list of




149 Id. at 934.
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then quickly dismissed the common law right of access, holding that even if the
information sought was public information, "FOIA has displaced the common
law right." 151
2. Dissent: Closer Scrutiny and Not "All or Nothing"
Judge David Tatel provided several objections in a forceful dissent. First, he
criticized the majority for essentially abdicating its role of sufficiently evaluating
the exemptions claims and being much too deferential to the government's
assertions. 152 While Judge Tatel he clearly, and notably, recognized the
government's interest in the post-9/11 security environment, 153 he thought that
the courts still had a substantial role to play in FOIA litigation and must inquire as
to the sufficiency of the government's justifications. 154 He simply would not give
as much leniency to the government's allegations as the majority did, believing
150Id. "The narrow First Amendment right of access to information recognized in
Richmond Newspapers does not extend to non-judicial documents that are not part of a criminal
trial, such as the investigatory documents at issue here." Id. The court explained:
[N]either this Court nor the Supreme Court has ever indicated that it would apply the
Richmond Newspapers [right of access to criminal proceedings] test to anything other than
criminal judicial proceedings. Indeed, there are no federal court precedents requiring,
under the First Amendment, disclosure of information compiled during an Executive
Branch investigation, such as the information sought in this case.
Id. at 935. "We will not convert the First Amendment right of access to criminal judicial
proceedings into a requirement that the government disclose information compiled during the
exercise of a quintessential executive power-the investigation and prevention of terrorism." Id.
151 Id. at 936. The court stated that the common law right of access extends to the public
records of all three branches of government. As such, there was a question of whether the
names of the detainees sought would be public information. Even assuming so, FOIA is the
proper vehicle to obtain government records, having preempted any common law right. Id.
152 E.g., id. at 939-40 (Tatel, J., dissenting) ("No matter the level of deference, our review
is not 'vacuous.' ") (citing Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408, 421 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). Judge Tatel
further explained, "[b]y accepting the government's vague, poorly explained allegations, and by
filing in the gaps in the government's case with its own assumptions about facts absent from the
record, this court has converted deference into acquiescence." Id. at 940.
153 Ctr.forNat'l Sec. Studies II, 331 F.3d at 937-38 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (recognizing the
"uniquely compelling governmental interests" of being able to protect the nation from future
terrorist attacks, but stating this interest must be balanced with the public's interest in knowing
whether the government has acted improperly toward the detainees).
154 See id. at 951 (pointing out that concerns over lawyers' safety must be described with
"reasonable specificity"); id. at 939 (stating that it was the "legislature's judgment that the
judiciary must play a meaningful role in reviewing FOIA exemption requests"); id. at 951
(stating that Congress created the judiciary's role to "require meaningful judicial review of all
government exemption claims").
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that the mere possibility of potential harms did not satisfy the statutory
requirement. 15 5
Judge Tatel's second major contention with the majority's opinion was that it
embraced an "all or nothing" approach to the requested documents and did not
require the government to segregate or categorize any of the names. 156 Judge
Tatel recognized that some, if not much, of the requested information should be
exempt, 157 so he ultimately posited that the case should be remanded to the lower
courts to allow the government to describe with particularity the basis on which it
was withholding the names or the categories of names. 158 He found it essential
that the government provide greater specific justification for each detainee or, at
least, each category of detainees. 159
155 Id. at 942-43 (Tatel, J., dissenting) ("That Reynolds believes these harms may result
from disclosure is hardly surprising-anything is possible. But before accepting the
government's argument, this court must insist on knowing whether these harms 'could
reasonably be expected to' result from disclosure-the standard Congress prescribed for
exemption under 7(A).").
156 Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies II, 331 F.3d at 940 (Tatel, J., dissenting) ("Although I have
no doubt that some of the requested information is exempt from FOIA's mandatory disclosure
requirement, the court treats disclosure as an all-or-nothing proposition .... ); id. ("[T]he
government bears the burden of reviewing the plaintiffs' request, identifying functional
categories of information that are exempt from disclosure, and disclosing any reasonably
segregable, non-exempt portion of the requested materials."); id. at 941 (The government's
request for exemption 7(A) "treats all detainees the same"); id. at 942 (stating that people with
critical information and other general detainees are "two different categories of people" and
"thus merit different treatment"); id. at 943 (Another failing with the court's analysis is that it
"treat[s] all detainee information the same...."); id. at 950 ("[T]he court's all-or-nothing
approach again impermissibly shifts the burden of identifying exempt information from the
government to plaintiffs."). NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 235-36
(1978), allows government agencies to exempt categories of records without having to justify
each individual record, or in this case, each detainee. The categories must be "sufficiently
distinct to allow a court to grasp 'how each.., category of documents, if disclosed, would
interfere with the investigation.' " Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 789
F.2d 64, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (quoting Campbell v. Dep't of Health & Human Services, 682
F.2d 256, 265 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
157 Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies II, 331 F.3d at 937 (Tatel, J., dissenting) ("While the
government's reasons for withholding some of the information may well be legitimate, the
court's uncritical deference eviscerates both FOIA itself and the principles of openness in
government that FOIA embodies.").
158 Id. at 951 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
159 Id. Judge Tatel stated:
If there are legitimate investigative reasons for releasing the names of some detainees, but
not others, then Mr. Reynolds or others responsible for the terrorism investigation should
explain those reasons under oath-in an in camera affidavit, if necessary to protect the
information-and that explanation would probably warrant judicial deference.
Id. at 944.
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Third, Judge Tatel stressed that the general principle of FOIA is one of
openness and that the exemptions should be narrowly applied. 160 With the
concern over potential abuses of detainees, the public had a vital interest in having
access to the names, even if there was some privacy interest on the part of the
individuals. 161 He also pointed out that the government had released some of the
160 Id. at 938 (Tatel, J., dissenting) ("To be sure, the statute strongly favors openness .... );
id. ("[These limited exemptions do not obscure the basic policy that disclosure, not secrecy, is
the dominant objective of the Act.") (internal quotations omitted). Thus, the exemptions must
be 'narrowly construed' and 'the burden is on the agency to sustain its action.' Id. (quoting John
Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp. 493 U.S. 146, 152 (1989)).
161 Id. at 946 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (stating that any privacy interest the detainees have "is
clearly outweighed by the public interest in knowing whether the government, in investigating
those heinous crimes, is violating the rights of persons it has detained"). The judge went on to
discuss the D.C. Circuit's precedent in SafeCard Services, Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1205-06
(D.C. Cir. 1991), that allowed a requestor to obtain names of individuals in law enforcement
files if the requestor is not doing so for personal reasons and if the requestor can show
compelling evidence that the agency is engaged in illegal activity, which the judge believed
applied in this case. Ctr.forNat'l Sec. Studies II, 331 F.3d 946-48 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
The ruling denying disclosure was especially disappointing to some because of the
recognized abuses of the post-9/1 1 detainees by the Department of Justice. See Press Release,
ACLU, ACLU Says Court Decision Allowing Secret Abuses Ignores Internal Justice
Department Report of 9/11 Detainee Abuse (June 17, 2003), at http://www.aclu.org
/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=12924&c=206 ("The American Civil Liberties Union
strongly criticized today's appeals court decision upholding the government's secret arrest
policy after 9/11, saying the ruling ignored mounting evidence of the government's misconduct
in its treatment of detainees held in the months after the attacks."); Richard A. Serrano,
Detained Innocents Tell of Ruin: U.S. 9/11 Dragnet Rife with Abuses, Many Contend, CHi.
TRIB., June 9, 2003, § 1, at 12; see also OFFICE OF THE INSPEC7OR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON
IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATACKS
(June 2003) (containing an extensive discussion on the Department of Justice's handling of the
post-9/11 detentions as well as the abuses in the process), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
oig/special/03-06/full.pdf. But see Steve Fainaru, Court Says Detainees' ID Can Be Kept
Secret, WASH. POST, June 18, 2003, at Al. Mr. Fainaru's article stated:
Steven R. Shapiro, legal director for the American Civil Liberties Union, said the [D.C.
Circuit] erred by apparently failing to take the inspector general's findings into
consideration.
However, Eugene Volokh, a professor of law at UCLA, said it was unreasonable to expect
the appellate court to consider as evidence the findings of a report that, however credible,
may have been based on hearsay testimony by witnesses not subject to cross-examination.
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names itself, thus contradicting its position that any disclosure of the names could
impair national security.162
3. Critique: Increased deference warranted, but it should not be applied
too broadly
The D.C. Circuit's holding illustrates the general trend toward greater judicial
deference in matters of terrorism threat protection and homeland security. 163 The
decision,164 however, may not be a perfect model even if one concedes that times
have changed and that courts must provide federal agencies more leeway in
withholding information.
The difference between the majority and dissent's views 165 of deference is
primarily a matter of degree. 166 The majority was only willing to analyze to a
162 Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies I, 331 F.3d at 944 (Tatel, J., dissenting). The majority,
however, countered that the government may choose to release some information deliberately
for strategic reasons, but "[t]he disclosure of a few pieces of information in no way lessens the
government's argument that complete disclosure would provide a composite picture of its
investigation and have negative effects on the investigation." Id. at 930; see also Fitzgibbon v.
CIA, 911 F,2d 755, 766 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("[T]he fact that information resides in the public
domain does not eliminate the possibility that further disclosures can cause harm to intelligence
sources, methods[,] and operations.").
163See Fainaru, supra note 161 ("Attorney General John D. Ashcroft applauded the
ruling .... 'We are pleased the court agreed we should not give terrorists a virtual roadmap to
our investigation that could allow terrorists to chart a potentially deadly detour around our
efforts,' [he said in a statement]."); Tom Brune, Appeals Court Backs U.S. on Secrecy,
Newsday, June 18, 2003, at A16 ("Attorney General John Ashcroft praised the ruling, calling it
'a victory for the Justice Department's careful measures to safeguard sensitive information
about our terrorism investigations as well as the privacy of individuals who chose not to make
public their connection to the government's probe.' ").
164 See Fainaru, supra note 161. Mr. Fainaru's article further stated:
Kate A. Martin, lead attorney for the Center of National Security Studies, part of the
coalition that challenged the policy, said an appeal is likely, although no decision has been
made on whether the groups would ask the full appellate court to review the case or appeal
directly to the Supreme Court.
Id.
165 See Fainaru, supra note 161 (pointing out that the writer of the majority opinion, Judge
David Sentelle, was a Reagan appointee to the court, and that he was joined in the opinion by
Judge Karen Henderson, an appointee of the first President Bush). The dissenting judge, Judge
David Tatel, was appointed by President Clinton. Id.
166 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 700 (2001) ("We realize that recognizing this
necessary Executive leeway [for immigration-related expertise] will often call for difficult
judgments."). Though it is in a different context, the Supreme Court recognized the difficulty in
pinpointing the appropriate amount of judicial deference.
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certain degree. It was content with non-searching 167 or non-probing 168 judicial
review, justifications that were "reasonable," 169 displayed an "adequate
connection" 170 or a loose version of a "rational link,"171 or, in the language of the
Third Circuit, security concerns that "seem credible."'172 While the majority was
willing to extend their deference to the expertise of the agency specialists, the
dissent was not persuaded that the judiciary ought now "simply... trust its
judgment."' 173 The majority correctly describes the substance of the entire debate
when it stated, "Exemption 7(A) explicitly requires a predictive judgment of the
harm that will result from disclosure of information."'174 The majority was
convinced that the agency experts were the proper source for this "predictive
judgment,"' 75 whereas the dissent, along with the district court, 176 insisted on
being more probing and requiring greater articulation from the government before
allowing non-disclosure. 177 The exemption's plain, open-ended language calls for
a fact-based judgment: "could reasonably be expected to interfere with
167 Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies I, 331 F.3d at 927 (stating that the D.C. Circuit has "found
it unwise to undertake searching judicial review").
168 Id. at 932 (highlighting the fact that the Third Circuit "did not search for specific
evidence that each of the INS detainees was involved in terrorism, nor did it embark on a
probing analysis of whether the government's concerns were well-founded").
169 Id. at 928 (stating that government expectation that terrorist groups could map a course
of the investigation by getting a complete list of names to be "reasonable"); id. at 929 ("[T]he
government's judgment that disclosure would deter or hinder cooperation by detainees is
reasonable."); id. at 931 ("It is therefore reasonable to assume that disclosure of their names
could impede the government's use of these potentially valuable witnesses.").
170 Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies II, 331 F.3d at 931. ("[T]he government's submissions
easily establish an adequate connection between both the material witness and the INS
detainees and terrorism to warrant full application of the deference principle.").
171 Id. (concluding that "the evidence presented in the declarations is sufficient to show a
rational link between disclosure and the harms alleged")
172 Id. at 932 (quoting N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 219 (3d
Cir. 2002)).
173 Id. at 939 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
174 Id at 928.
175 Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies II, 331 F.3d at 928. ("It is abundantly clear that the
government's top counterterrorism officials are well-suited to make this predictive judgment.
Conversely, the judiciary is in an extremely poor position to second-guess the executive's
judgment in this area of national security."). This is also in accord with the statute's explicit
language that "a court shall accord substantial weight to an affidavit of an agency concerning
the agency's determination [of]... subsection (b) [the propriety/necessity of exemption]." 5
U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2000) (emphasis added).
176 See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
177 See supra notes 152-55, 160.
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enforcement proceedings." 178 This Note contends that the post-9/11 security
environment calls for increased deference to the executive branches for such a
judgment, but the courts still must serve a screening function, albeit with a lower
standard of analysis. 179 As such, the majority, in Center for National Security
Studies, may have been closer to the mythical perfect balance. It is a close case,
and different courts would undoubtedly differ on what level of evidence and
specification to require in order to meet the exemption language's threshold.
The dissent makes a strong point regarding the government's unwillingness
to segregate names which have a better argument for exemption and those which
are practically harmless. 180 The government should be required to go the extra
mile and provide a justification for each name, or at least each category of names,
in order to get the exemption coverage, as enunciated in NLRB v. Robbins Tire &
Rubber Co.181 If the government does not make such a categorization, and cannot
provide an explanation describing why categorization was not appropriate, courts
should analyze the FOIA denial with greater scrutiny. 182 This suggestion calls
178 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) (2000) (emphasis added). See supra note 54 for a discussion
regarding the change of the statutory language from "would reasonably be expected" to "could
reasonably be expected." Such a change "represent[ed] a considered congressional effort to
'ease considerably a Federal law enforcement agency's burden in invoking [the exemption].' "
United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 756
n.9 (1989).
179 A good description of such a "screening function" was given in Gardels v. CIA, 689
F.2d 1100, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1982). ("Once satisfied that proper procedures have been followed
and that the information logically falls into the exemption claimed, the courts 'need not go
further to test the expertise of the agency, or to question its veracity when nothing appears to
raise the issue of good faith.' ") (quoting Weissman v. CIA, 565 F.2d 692, 697 (D.C. Cit.
1977)).
180 See supra notes 156-61 and accompanying text.
181 437 U.S. 214 (1978). This landmark case established that a federal agency was
permitted to make a "generic" showing of interference for entire categories of law enforcement
records rather than being required to justify the exemption on a case by case basis. This concept
is still precedent for courts even though the decision came before the 1986 amendments, so
agencies can still make the "generic category" argument, but these categories mainly involve
witness statements and notes of interviews of and correspondence with charging parties when
there is a charge on the horizon. See J.P. Stevens & Co., v. Perry, 710 F.2d 136, 143 (4th Cir.
1983) (holding that early release of affidavits and interviews of charging parties and witnesses,
correspondence with attorneys, and internal memoranda concerning EEOC investigation would
interfere with enforcement proceeding by chilling potential witnesses, drying up sources of
information, hampering agency communication about the investigation). If the information is
not in one of these specific, limited categories, the government must demonstrate the
connection between the information they are trying to exempt and the "interference" it will
cause with law enforcement proceedings.
182 This is in line with the plain language of the statute that allows FOIA exemptions for
law enforcement purposes "only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement
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into question the viability of the "mosaic theory" to exemption 7(A) cases. 183
While the dissent, in Center for National Security Studies, points out that
deference to such a theory was formerly only granted in exemption 1 and 3
cases, 184 the reality of our new homeland security situation necessitates allowing
it to be extended to exemption 7. Just as the new Office of Homeland Security
has, to a large degree, merged law enforcement, national security, and intelligence
functions, 185 FOIA exemption 1 and 7(A) must be viewed with considerable
overlap. 186 However, as the government should be required to segregate records
to a reasonable degree, 187 invocation of the mosaic theory should warrant closer
scrutiny by courts.
records or information... could reasonably be expected to interfere .... 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(7)(A) (2000) (emphasis added).
183 See supra note 139-40 and accompanying text.
184 See supra note 141.
185 See supra note 29; see also Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President
Bush Signs Homeland Security Act (Nov. 25, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2002/l 11/20021125-6.html. President Bush stated that "[tihe new department will
analyze threats, will guard our borders and airports, protect our critical infrastructure, and
coordinate the response of our nation for future emergencies. The Department of Homeland
Security will focus the full resources of the American government on the safety of the
American people." Id. The President also stated that
this new department will analyze intelligence information on terror threats collected by the
CIA, the FBI, the National Security Agency and others. The department will match this
intelligence against the nation's vulnerabilities-and work with other agencies, and the
private sector, and state and local governments to harden America's defenses against terror.
Id.
186 Exemption 1 withholds information "specifically authorized under criteria established
by an Executive Order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy
and... are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive Order." 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(1)(A), (B). Exemption 7(A) withholds information compiled for law enforcement
purposes that "could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings." 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) (2000).
187 The statute requires that "[any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be
provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt
under this subsection." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (emphasis added). See Flightsafety Serv. Corp. v.
Dep't of Labor, 326 F.3d 607, 612 (5th Cir. 2003) (allowing non-disclosure if "any disclosable
information is so inextricably intertwined with the exempt, confidential information that
producing it would require substantial agency resources and produce a document of little
informational value[," even where only a "representative sample" of documents was presented
to the district court for review); Trans-Pac. Policing Agreement v. United States Customs Serv.,
177 F.3d 1022, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ("It has long been a rule in this Circuit that non-exempt
portions of a document must be disclosed unless they are inextricably intertwined with exempt
portions." (quoting Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Dep't of the Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 260 (D.C.
Cir. 1977))); Solar Sources v. United States, 142 F.3d 1033, 1039 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that a
small percentage of documents that could be disclosed were not reasonably segregable from
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C. Related Post-9/11 Cases
Center for National Security Studies v. Department of Justice is unique, to
this point, in how squarely it fits the question of whether FOIA was indeed altered
with the Ashcroft and Card Memorandums and how one court reacted in the post-
9/11 atmosphere. There are some related cases, though, that shed light on
different courts' approaches to open access after September 2001.
Along with North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft1 88 the Center for
National Security Studies majority referenced other circuits' decisions to
demonstrate the other courts' post-9/11 willingness to defer to the government's
request to tighten security; these cases include the Fourth Circuit's decision in
Hamdi v. Rumsfield,i89 the Seventh Circuit's decision in Global Relief
Foundation v. O'Neill,190 and another Fourth Circuit case, Hamdi v.
Rumsfield.19 1
The Sixth Circuit went against this growing tide of deference in Detroit Free
Press v. Ashcroft, 192 a case in which three news agencies sought an injunction
under a First Amendment Freedom of Press claim after the government closed the
non-citizen removal hearings of primarily Arab and Muslim men.193 The Sixth
Circuit found that there was a right of access to deportation hearings because such
hearings are similar to judicial hearings wherein there is a recognized right of
access. 194 The government attempted to argue that the Richmond Newspapers
standard of access was limited to the judicial context and that administrative
documents that were properly withheld); Lead Indus. Ass'n v. OSHA, 610 F.2d 70, 86 (2d Cir.
1979) ("[1]f the proportion of nonexempt factual material is relatively small and is so
interspersed with exempt material that separation by the agency and policing of this by the
courts would impose an inordinate burden, the material is still protected because, although not
exempt, it is not 'reasonably segregable."') (citation omitted).
188 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002); see supra note 145-46 and accompanying text.
189 296 F.3d 278, 282-83 (4th Cir. 2002) (disallowing an alleged enemy combatant the
right of unmonitored access to counsel).
190 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir. 2002) (upholding the constitutionality of a portion of the
USA-PATRIOT Act that allows ex parte use of classified evidence in proceedings to freeze
terrorist organization assets).
191 316 F.3d 450, 476 (4th Cir. 2003) (dismissing habeas corpus petition of U.S. citizen
captured in Afghanistan challenging his military detention and designation as an enemy
combatant).
192 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002).
193 See id. at 684.
194 See id. at 695-96 (citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555
(1980)). Richmond Newspapers employed a two-part "experience and logic" test to determine
whether a particular aspect of a proceeding outside of the actual trial phases should be open to
the public. See id. at 695.
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proceedings should be governed by a more deferential standard. 195 The court was
unpersuaded because the facts of the case where the Supreme Court granted more
deference were distinguishable and this administrative proceeding exhibited
"substantial quasi-judicial characteristics."' 96 Further, the court found that
deportation hearings had traditionally been accessible to the public, 197 and public
access plays a significant positive role in deportation hearings. 198 The court
recognized, however, that there could be a limit to the public's right of access if
the government could demonstrate a compelling interest under strict scrutiny
analysis. 199 Though the court found that the government did show a compelling
interest, 20 0 its directives were not narrowly tailored or required particularized
findings on a case-by-case basis. 201 This insight is particularly revealing because
it shows that the court would have been willing to grant deference to the
government to deal with its compelling interest of combating terrorism if the
government had demonstrated particularized, or categorized, findings rather than
asserting an all-or-nothing type approach to the exemption. 202 The Center for
195 Id. at 694 (citing Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978)).
196 Id. The court also noted that "it is clear that the [Supreme] Court has since moved
away from its position in Houchins [of less access in administrative proceedings] and
recognizes that there is a limited constitutional right to some government information." Id. at
695.
197 Id. at 700-03.
198 Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 703-05 (6th Cir. 2002). The positive
roles that the public plays in the process included: acting as a check on the actions of the
Executive, ensuring the government does its job properly, serving as a "therapeutic" resource
for those who might think they are being targeted after September 11, enhancing the perception
of integrity and fairness, and ensuring the individual citizen can participate in the process.
199 The compelling governmental interest would have to be narrowly tailored and be
specifically articulated enough to allow a reviewing court to determine if closure was proper. Id.
at 705 (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982) and Press-Enter.
Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986)).
200 Id. at 706 ("'The Government certainly has a compelling interest in preventing
terrorism."). The Sixth Circuit disagreed with the district court and found the government's
arguments for prohibiting public access compelling. Id. at 705-06. Displaying much the same
type of deference that FOIA exemption 1 cases often receive, the court stated: "Inasmuch as
these agents' declarations establish that certain information revealed during removal
proceedings could impede the ongoing anti-terrorism investigation, we defer to their judgment.
These agents are certainly in a better position to understand the contours of the investigation
and the intelligence capabilities of terrorist organizations." Id at 707.
201 Id. at 707-10.
202 Detroit Free Press, then, supports this author's thesis that deference should be granted
to agency expertise on security, but there needs to be some reasonable attempt to categorize and
separate requests. 303 F.3d at 703-05. Invoking deference for an entire list, if a sizeable request
with many items, should be viewed with greater scrutiny by the courts. See supra notes 181-82
and accompanying text.
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National Security Studies majority recognized that "not all courts are in
agreement" regarding increased deference,20 3 and that it did not find the Sixth
Circuit's reasoning compelling.204
Ayyad v. Department of Justice,20 5 a district court case, dealt with a plaintiff
convicted of participating in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing who made a
FOIA request for all documents relating to the investigation of him. The court
found that the government satisfied its burden under exemption 7(A) since there
was an on-going investigation of a potential co-conspirator with which it could
interfer, and the government "provided adequate evidence of the specific harm
anticipated should the individual categories of information be released."
206
Though the case was filed before September 11, 2001, and the government did
not discuss that event at all,20 7 the court did make special note of the increased
likelihood of a terrorist threat and how information rationally tied to law
enforcement purposes deserved deference. 208
Exemption 7 was slated to receive a clearer exegesis from the Supreme Court
after it granted writ of certiorari on City of Chicago v. United States Department
of Treasury,209 where the Seventh Circuit denied the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms ("ATF) the exemption 7 denial that they sought because
the Bureau failed to demonstrate sufficient specificity of the harms alleged.
210
203 Ctr.forNat'l Sec. Studies II, 331 F.3d at 932.
204 I.
205 No. 00 Civ. 960 (KTD), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6925 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2002).
206 Id. at *9.
207 Id. at *9 n.4.
208 The court wrote:
The crime at issue here is an act of terrorism. Also, I take judicial notice that Plaintiff
is a member of a network of co-conspirators, who have additionally been implicated in the
acts of September l1th. As those events show, some of Plaintiff's co-conspirators may
have evaded capture and may still be engaging in terrorist activities in the United States.
There is a high likelihood that Plaintiffs file contains information regarding previously
less active "sleeper cells" that the Government may need to use to detect threats to the
integrity of the nation's security. Thus, intensifying my concerns about the potential harm
of releasing Aayad's FBI file.
Id. at *8-9.
209 287 F.3d 628 (7th Cir. 2002) [hereinafter City of Chicago 1], amended upon denial of
rehearing en banc, 297 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2002) [hereinafter City of Chicago II], and cert.
granted, 71 U.S.L.W. 3337 (U.S. Nov. 12, 2002) (No. 02-0322).
210 City of Chicago 1, 287 F.3d at 634 ("The potential for interference set forth by ATF is
only speculative and not the 'actual, contemplated enforcement proceeding' that Congress had
in mind when drafting Exemption 7(A) [citing NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber, 437 U.S. 214,
232 (1978)]."). The Seventh Circuit stated that the government was not required to show a
specific instance where released information had interfered with an enforcement proceeding. Id.
However, in order to meet the requirement for the FOIA exemption, the court stated that the
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However, the Court removed the case from the docket, cancelled the oral
argument scheduled for March 4, 2003, and vacated the Seventh Circuit's
decision 21' after Congress passed a statute that specifically prohibits the ATF, in
certain circumstances, from using appropriated funds to comply with FOIA
requests212-creating a new issue and necessitating remand to the lower courts
for consideration in light of the recent legislation. Though it was not a homeland
security situation, the case was a good example of how courts have dealt with the
salient issue of how specific a nexus the government must demonstrate in order to
receive exemption 7, or exemption 1, protection to deny FOIA requests.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS: GREATER DEFERENCE TO FOIA's LAW
ENFORCEMENT EXEMPTIONS IS APPROPRIATE IF PROPERLY SEGREGATED
AND TAILORED TO HOMELAND SECURITY MATTERS
FOIA has had quite a roller-coaster ride since the mid-1960s, and the post-
9/11 emphasis on homeland protection has provided a new twist. Though
advocacy groups have expressed concern over the Administration's measures,213
it seems possible that the rhetoric may be overblown.2 14 The approach to FOIA
for both the executive branch and the judiciary has shifted a bit, but the increased
deference for law enforcement agencies to withhold information under
exemption 1 or exemption 7 of FOIA is a necessary step to promote greater
homeland protection. FOIA's language is still intact, and the executive branch,
with the mandate for homeland protection, deserves flexibility considering our
government did need to show that its predictions of a possible risk were reasonable, "not only
far-fetched hypothetical scenarios; without a more substantial, realistic risk of interference." Id.
The court also refused to grant deference to the agency's expertise on the matter, because such
deference is limited to when "the agency has demonstrated with specificity a logical connection
between the information withheld and identified investigations, and where the agency has
submitted uncontroverted affidavits." Id. at 633.
211 Dep't of Justice v. City of Chicago, 71 U.S.L.W. 3565 (U.S. Feb. 26, 2003) (No. 02-
322). For more information on the case and legislation, see OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND
PRIVACY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FOIA POST: SUPREME COURT TO DECIDE LAW
ENFORCEMENT DATABASE CASE (posted Nov. 22, 2002), at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapostl
2002foiapost28.htm.
212 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-007, § 644, 117
Stat. 11,473-74 (2003).
213 See supra notes 83-84; see also Giuffo, supra note 83 (" 'I think [increased
government secrecy] is genuinely a crisis,' said Doug Clifton, Editor of the Cleveland Plain
Dealer.").
214 See supra note 90; see also Hammitt, supra note 82 ("While there is no substantial
empirical evidence that any of these [Attorney General] memos worked a significant influence
on implementation, clearly they do set the tone by which the administration will be known.").
1646 [Vol. 64:1605
2003] FREEDOM OF INFORMATIONACTIN POST-9/11 WORLD
current world environment. 215 While courts will and ought to defer to agency
expertise, they must still serve as screeners for some minimal justification and
necessary segregation to ensure that the exemptions are not abused-even if it is
just to ensure that the proper procedures for FOIA denials are followed. 216 The
executive branch must also ensure that such deference is limited to matters of
homeland security so that it is not abused and the spirit of FOIA is not thwarted.
The standard for exemption 1 or 7 claims should now be the government's
ability to demonstrate some minimal "rational link" to a potential harm,217 along
with demonstrating sufficient categorization of requests so invocation of
deference is not overly broad.218 Again, this should not be an excessively high
standard-that is the whole point of increased deference. 219 Courts still have a
215 See Kirtley Interview, supra note 27 (stating that the solution to the executive branch's
actions may rest in litigation or more congressional involvement through either oversight or
passing another law).
216 See supra note 179.
217 See Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies 1, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 102 ("[T]he Government has not
met its burden of establishing a 'rational link' between the harms alleged and disclosure."
(citing Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, 789 F.2d 64, 67 (D.C. Cir.
1986))); see also City of Chicago v. United States Dep't of the Treasury, 287 F.3d 628, 633 (7th
Cir. 2002) ("[Seven (A)] deference is limited only to situations in which the agency has
demonstrated with specificity a logical connection between the information withheld and
identified investigations."). As is often found, it is a matter of courts' statutory interpretation
with how the 7(A) language "could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement
proceedings" will be read and applied. See notes 165-78 and accompanying text for an in-depth
analysis of this debate as contained in Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies II. For an exhaustive
description of exemption 7 litigation and how different courts have dealt with this situation, see
LmGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL OPEN GOVERNMENT LAWS 155-84 (Allan R. Adler ed.,
1997).
218 See supra note 187.
219 See supra notes 167-72. For the Third Circuit in N. Jersey Media Group, government
claims just needed to "seem credible." N. Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 219
(3d Cir. 2002). For the Center for National Securities Studies court, government claims just
needed to be "reasonable" with little scrutiny. Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies II, 331 F.3d at 926. In
the exemption 1 context (withholding authorized under Executive Order if related to national
security), the D.C. District Court noted in ACLU v. Dep't of Justice, 265 F. Supp. 2d 20, 29-30
(D.D.C. 2003), that "the governing standard in this [exemption 1] context is not especially
onerous: the agency must demonstrate 'a logical connection between the information and the
claimed exemption, and [the affidavits submitted to draw this connection] are not controverted
by either contrary evidence in the record nor by evidence of bad faith.' " (quoting Abbotts v.
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 766 F.2d 604, 606 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). The D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals has stated:
The test is not whether the court personally agrees in full with the [agency's] evaluation of
the danger-rather, the issue is whether on the whole record the [a]gency's judgment
objectively survives the test of reasonableness, good faith, specificity, and plausibility in
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role in the FOIA process to ensure procedures were properly followed and that
there is a measure of reason and rationality to the government's claims, but our
national security necessitates a shift in deference so courts do not overly scrutinize
agency decisions. 220 The Ashcroft Memo still requires a "sound legal basis" for
any exemption, 221 so while agencies may be a bit more conservative in their
decisions, fears of extreme government secrecy are not warranted because the
FOIA language remains unchanged. 222
There is a very real threat of terrorism that is now undeniable, 223 along with
the aftermath of the Iraq war, and overall Middle-East instability. The executive
this field of foreign intelligence in which the [agency] is expert and given by Congress a
special role.
Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d 1100, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Again, it is recognized that this court is
describing exemption 1 deference, but the line between exemption 1 and exemption 7 may be
blurred a bit in the current national security context. See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying
text.
220 Again, the statute's explicit language states that "a court shall accord substantial
weight to an affidavit of an agency concerning the agency's determination [of] ... subsection
(b) [the propriety/necessity of exemption]." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (emphasis added).
221 See Ashcroft Memo, supra note 76, at para. 5.
222 The Homeland Security Act of 2002 contained a new platform for a 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(3) exemption which covers materials "specifically exempted from disclosure by
statute." The Homeland Security Act mandated that "critical infrastructure" information
voluntarily submitted to the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") be exempt from either
federal or state FOIA disclosure. Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, § 214(a)(1)(A) (to be
codified at 6 U.S.C. § 133(a)(1)(A)). The legislation allows businesses and other institutions to
provide information to the DHS that could be relevant to homeland protection and not fear such
information being released to the public. Such congressional action strengthens belief in the
present FOIA language using basic legislative analysis: if members of Congress looked at
FOIA, albeit to a small degree, and did not make any changes, they must believe the present
language is appropriate.
223 See Floyd Abrams, Address: The First Amendment and the War Against Terrorism, 5
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1 (2002):
To start: I am persuaded that the degree of threat to our individual security is
unparalleled in American history. We live in a new world in which foreign terrorists,
dedicated to our destruction, suicidal in behavior, and with possible access to modem
weapons, imperil our people. If I thought otherwise, I would have very different views
with respect to many of the comments I will offer to you today. If I thought the A]-Qaeda
threat was a passing one, or akin to that of the Barbary pirates of the past, or the equivalent
(as Michael Mandelbaum has argued) of a "badly stubbed toe" that caused pain and shock
but left "the world ... much as it had [been] before," I would not be at all so ready to make
painful compromises between the claims of security and freedom.
But I do consider the terrorist threats to us to be real and continuing, and thus
transformative in their impact. MIT Professor Stephen Van Evera put it well when he said
recently that "[wie're in a struggle to the death with these people. They'd bring in nuclear
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branch has the very difficult task of attempting to prevent future terrorist tragedies
and if it concludes that concepts of open government must be narrowed, it
deserves that discretion. 224 While the standard terrorist organization may not get
all of their plans and schemes by using FOIA,225 the executive branch is justified
in tightening the reins on information which could be put to a destructive use.226
The stakes are simply too high to allow a free flow of information, so the
government's preventive efforts must be given some leniency at this time. Even
open-government advocates respect the fact that the homeland security situation
necessitates prudence.227 FOIA can always be re-evaluated periodically for
weapons here if they could. I think this could be the highest threat to our national security
ever: a non-deterrable enemy that may acquire weapons of mass destruction."
Id. at 2-3.
224 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 700 (2001) ("Ordinary principles of judicial
review in this area recognize primary Executive Branch responsibility. They counsel judges to
give expert agencies decisionnaking leeway in matters that invoke their expertise." (citing
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 651-52 (1990))); Johnson v.
Executive Office for United States Attorneys, 310 F.3d 771, 776 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (The court
declined "to establish a brightline set of steps for an agency to take" in determining whether
third parties are alive or dead, because the FOIA, "requiring as it does both systematic and case-
specific exercises of discretion and administrative judgment and expertise, is hardly an area in
which the courts should attempt to micro manage the executive branch."); see also Scordato &
Monopoli, supra note 14, at 185 ("Prior external threats against the United States, dating back
to the early days of our nation's history, have previously pushed Americans to agree to limits on
their constitutional freedoms in pursuit of a larger goal-internal security.").
225 See infra note 241 and accompanying text.
226 Again, recognize that under a plain meaning approach to exemption 7 all that is
required is that releasing information to the public "could reasonably be expected to interfere
with enforcement proceedings." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) (2000) (emphasis added). This
standard should be flexible with the times, and security experts in the Department of Justice or
other federal agencies are in the best position to determine if there is a reasonable possibility of
interference or threat to homeland protection.
227See Abrams, supra note 223, at 5 ("My view, in short, is that we must accept that we
now live at a level of vulnerability which requires distressing steps of a continuing nature in an
effort to protect ourselves."); Kathleen Murphy, War on Terror Restricts Information Flow,
STATEIANE.ORG, Aug. 28, 2002, at http://foi.missouri.edu/terrorismfoi/waronterror.html (last
modified Aug. 30, 2002) (quoting Tim Franklin, Editor of the ORLANDo SENTINEL, "I don't
think anybody is suggesting that we should help give terrorists a playbook on how to wreak
havoc. But at the same time, the thing that makes this country special in the world is that the
government officials are held accountable for their actions on a regular basis."); Giuffo, supra
note 83 (In an article about open records advocates' displeasure with the Administration's limits
on disclosure, most advocates and journalists did recognize that "sensitive data.., was
reasonable to limit," but they were concerned this discretion had spilled over into non-law
enforcement or homeland security areas.); Hammitt, supra note 82 ("There may be sound
reasons during our current crisis to protect information that during more benign times might be
ripe for disclosure."); Press Release, supra note 84 ("The government should protect
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adjustment, and surely will be with each new administration.228 The Act's
substantial costs should prompt lawmakers to consider curtailing FOIA's reach as
well.229 Since the USA PATRIOT Act has "sunset provisions,"2 30 any limiting of
information as necessary-but only for as long as necessary-to protect national security.");
Davis, supra note 7 ("There is no question that in the world we live in today, there is some
information that must remain secret to protect our national security. Beyond that narrow but
important spectrum, however, the Congress, the public and the press should have maximum
access to government information.").
228 At least one journalist, Laura Parker, has reported:
Peter Swire, a law professor at Ohio State University who served as a counsel on privacy
in the Clinton administration, says that historically, the U.S. government has eased off
demands for secrecy when two things have occurred.
"One is the reduced perception of threat. Things get better. The war ends," he says.
'The second is proven abuses caused by secrecy. So far, the Bush administration has been
effective. We hope we won't need congressional hearings to show how tragically wrong
this instinct for secrecy has been."
Parker et al., supra note 84, at IA.
229 See OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND PRIVACY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FOIA POST:
SumMARY OF ANNUAL FOIA REPORTS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2001 (posted Oct. 17, 2002),
http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/2002foiapost27.htm.
The costs for all federal FOIA offices in Fiscal Year 2001 was $287,792,04. Id.
Compliance with FOIA necessitated 4,924.715 work-years to process 2,246,212 requests for all
federal agencies. Id. The Department of Justice was one of the leading federal departments in
every statistical category, with 196,917 requests that produced 1,055.98 work-years, for its
1,000 full-time FOIA employees. Id. Total FOIA costs for the Department of Justice alone were
$74,336,344. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA),
REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2001, at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/annual-report/2001/01
foiapg9.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2003).
While the government can charge FOIA requestors for search and duplication, often these
fees are waived if disclosure is "in the public interest." 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(4)(A), (A)(iii)
(2000). Most noteworthy, most federal agencies do not receive any categorized funding for
FOIA compliance and must draw from their operating budget to fund FOIA offices. See Robert
L. Saloschin, The Department of Justice and the Explosion of Freedom of Information Act
Litigation, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1401, 1405 n.18 (2000) (Saloschin concluded that it was almost
impossible to approximate the cost of administering FOIA, except that it was in the many
millions: "In addition, we noted that money was not directly appropriated for FOIA work, but
instead, it was actually funded from money designated for other agency activities."). Congress
recently passed legislation that specifically prohibits the ATF from using appropriated funds on
FOIA requests. See supra note 212. Often, agencies must assign trained law enforcement or
intelligence personnel to full-time FOIA work. See Freedom of Information Act: Hearings
Before the Senate Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., Ist
Sess. 578-79 (1981) (containing a statement of CIA Director William Casey reporting that the
CIA had to assign two hundred individuals to review FOIA requests to ensure that confidential
information was not disclosed).
While open government is an obviously noble desire, such aspirations must recognize the
enormous costs to taxpayers in an era when federal budgets do not have a penny to spare. See
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information by the Justice Department will also likely sunset.231 Where the
executive branch may want to scale back on information release for homeland
protection, the judiciary should evaluate whether FOIA exemption claims are
legitimate (albeit with a more deferential disposition), and Congress can evaluate
FOIA's status and adjust the language if it believes that federal agencies and
courts are out of line.232 The separation of powers, thus, will synergistically work
Lowe, supra note 69, at 1285-86 ("Today, FOIA is not operating as Congress intended ....
Thus, when courts interpret FOIA provisions or the executive establishes new FOIA guidelines,
it is imperative that the interests of the agencies are recognized along with the public's right to
disclosure."). A single request by one former CIA agent cost over $400,000. See Agee v. CIA,
517 F. Supp. 1335, 1342 n.5 (D.D.C. 1981). One of the reasons President Ford vetoed the 1974
amendments was the significant cost to federal agencies. See 120 CONG. REc. 36,243 (1974);
Orrin G. Hatch, Balancing Freedom of Information with Confidentiality for Law Enforcement,
9 J. CONTEMP. L. 1, 9 (1983) (President Ford "pointed out that the law enforcement agencies
would be economically hampered because the agencies could not afford to hire the large
number of highly trained personnel necessary to review requested confidential files and
records."). The 1974 amendments significantly expanded FOIA provisions and subsequently
escalated the costs:
What happened in the 1974 amendments to the Freedom of Information Act is similar to
what happened in much of the regulatory legislation and rulemaking of that era: an entirely
desirable objective was pursued singlemindedly to the exclusion of equally valid
competing interests. In the currently favored terminology, a lack of cost-benefit analysis; in
more commonsensical terms, a loss of all sense of proportion.
Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of Information Act Has No Clothes, REG. Mar.-Apr. 14, 16
(1982). Justice Scalia called FOIA "the Taj Mahal of the Doctrine of Unanticipated
Consequences, the Sistine Chapel of Cost-Benefit Analysis Ignored." Id. at 15; see also
McMasters, supra note 71 ('Thirty years later, the friends of FOIA in official Washington
remain few and far between and the complaints familiar .... It is exploited by journalists to
invade personal privacy and endanger national security.").
230 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 224(a) (2001) (requiring
that expanded surveillance measures "shall cease to have effect on December 31, 2005.").
231 See War on Terrorism Reduces Access to Information, (Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty broadcast, Apr. 5, 2002), at http://www.rferl.org/welcome/english/releases/2002/04/88-
050402.html (Leonard Sussman, senior scholar at Freedom House, "noted that the USA
PATRIOT... Act recently passed by the U.S. Congress strikes a good balance [between
protection and liberty] by including a sunset provision to end these monitoring practices [and
the slowdown of information] in four years."). Depending on the national and international
environment, the Administration should recognize that security measures cannot remain at the
highest level forever. See Hammitt, supra note 82 ("It would be a real shame if we permanently
forfeited our right of access to government information because of short-term goals.").
232 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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to ensure that FOIA's principles, with some flexibility, are still adhered to in the
context of this threat.233
There are three primary dangers that might be present with the recent FOIA
adjustments. First, as previously discussed, the overbreadth concern is based upon
the premise that federal agencies will not make a reasonable effort to categorize
or segregate requests so that the potential dangers can be better evaluated. 234
Second, with the courts being the objective evaluators of how federal agencies are
handling FOIA requests and exemptions, the cases must get to court, which will
only occur if the denied party pursues the appeal process.235 There is not a great
deal of litigation yet on federal agency FOIA abuses, and cases like Center for
National Security Studies are rare at this point. The potential for abuse, though,
exists because agencies may display the attitude, leaning on the Ashcroft Memo,
that they will deny borderline cases and hope that the requestor does not appeal or
that the courts will be sympathetic if it is a homeland security topic, as many
critics have feared.236 This, however, could be more of a theoretical problem than
reality bears out. FOIA requestors who seek open government for the value of
allowing public scrutiny predominantly tend to be media representatives and
public interest organizations (as seen in Center for National Security Studies).237
233 See Kirtley Interview, supra note 27 (stating that litigation or Congress' passing of
another law could "turn into a very interesting battle of separation of powers").
234 See supra notes 156-59, 187 and accompanying text.
235 Under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A), a FOIA request that is denied may be appealed to the
head of the agency and must be reevaluated. While exhausting the administrative appeals prior
to seeking judicial relief is not expressly codified, at least four circuit courts have held that it is
implied that the administrative process be exhausted before heading to court. See Hedley v.
United States, 594 F.2d 1043, 1044 (5th Cir. 1979); accord Scherer v. Balkema, 840 F.2d 437,
443 (7th Cir. 1988); Brumley v. Dep't of Labor, 767 F.2d 444,445 (8th Cir. 1985); Stebbins v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 757 F.2d 364, 366 (D.C. Cir. 1985). For more information on
appealing a FOIA denial, see LITIGATION, supra note 217, at 7-8.
236 As one expert noted:
[The Ashcroft Memo is] sending a signal to government agencies that if they
wish to withhold information, the Justice Department will defend them. And,
you know, there are literally hundreds, if not thousands of Freedom of
Information Act decisions from courts, ranging from district courts all the way
up to the Supreme Court, that have provided some kind of justification or
pretext for withholding virtually every document in the possession of
government. So it would be very easy to defend almost any attempt to withhold
any information. And if the Justice Department is going to do that, that means
that requesters are going to have a terrible time trying to pry information loose.
Kirtley Interview, supra note 27.
237 See supra note 103; see also Saloschin, supra note 229, at 1403-04 (Saloschin notes
that after the 1974 amendments, "the number of FOIA-related matters in the [Freedom of
Information] Committee and in many agencies expanded explosively. The causes of this
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These entities do have the resources, motivation, and where-with-all to pursue
litigation. Thus, with all of the media and advocacy organizations, FOIA abuses
by federal agencies will likely get noticed, and get litigated.
The third major concern for recent FOJA alterations is that the expanded
liberty granted for homeland protection will be expanded to other government
matters that have no connection to security.238 The most noticeable example of
this is Vice President Cheney's energy task force that was not released, nor has
been, to Congress or the public.239 Open-government advocates seem most
concerned about how the zeitgeist for homeland protection has had such an
overbreadth effect on unrelated topics,240 while the Justice Department would
deny such an assertion.241 There is also the argument that restricting FOIA does
not deter terrorism in any sense because terrorists are much too sophisticated to
increase included the vigorous use of FOIA by Ralph Nader and his associates [and] ... the use
of FOIA by various scholars, advocates, and authors .... ).
238 See, e.g., Parker et al., supra note 84, at IA (reporting one case in which an individual
sought a 30-year-old map of Africa to plan a relief mission and the National Archives told him
that the government no longer makes such information public and another case in which
another individual sought environmental information on chemical plants but was denied the
information by the EPA).
239 See Dana Milbank, Cheney Refuses Records' Release, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 2002, at
Al; Elisabeth Bumiller, ENRON's Many Strands: The Vice President; Cheney Is Set to Battle
Congress to Keep His ENRON Talks Secret, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2002, at Al; Neely Tucker,
Cheney-GAO Showdown Goes to Court, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 2002, at A5; Don Van Natta
Jr., Cheney Argues Against Giving Congress Records, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2002, at Al. As
one critic has noted:
The Bush administration's refusal to disclose information to Congress or the public about
actions taken by Vice President Dick Cheney's energy policy task force showed clearly the
administration's philosophy of secrecy. For the first time, the General Accounting Office-
an arm of Congress-sued the executive branch, because it cannot get the basic facts about
who participated in what meetings.
Davis, supra note 7.
240 See Murphy, supra note 227 ("Many state officials have followed Ashcroft's lead,
arguing that restricting public access to many kinds of information will help prevent future
attacks by hampering terrorists' activities. But civil rights groups and journalists counter that
many of the restrictions have little to do with preventing terrorism.").
241 The Attorney General vigorously defended the withholding of information last year:
"I cannot and will not divulge information ... that will damage the national security of the
United States, the safety of its citizens or our efforts to ensure the same in an ongoing
investigation," Ashcroft told a Senate panel in December [2001]. "Each action taken by
the Department of Justice... is carefully drawn to target a narrow class of individuals:
terrorists. Our legal powers are targeted at terrorists. Our investigation is focused on
terrorists. Our prevention strategy targets the terrorist threat."
Parker et al., supra note 84, at IA.
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draw their information from the formal process of FOIA.24 2 The Bush
Administration risks losing both credibility and popularity if it does not contain
the executive deference that it has been granted, in matters like government
release of information under the FOIA, to only those spheres where appropriate.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Freedom of Information Act has had a remarkable history, from its
inception in 1966, through congressional amendments and the spin of previous
presidential administrations. The Bush Administration's steps after September 11,
2001, have added a new chapter to the FOIA story. Courts extended considerable
deference to exemption 1 even prior to 9/11, and exemption 7 was alive and well
before the terrorist attacks as well. Courts must continue to play a screening role
and demand some minimal justification along with a reasonable attempt of
segregation of exempted categories. The outcry over the Ashcroft and Card
Memos is exaggerated considering the grave concern of national security.
Specifically, these memos are the rational policy choices for our present
environment. FOIA's reach has shifted, but any increased deference for law
enforcement agencies to withhold information under exemption 1 or exemption 7
of FOIA is appropriate if it is not applied too broadly and is limited to matters of
homeland security. FOIA is not going away, and a denial by a federal agency still
needs to have a "sound legal basis." However, the reality of our new homeland
security situation prompts sacrifices such as more deference for FOIA
exemptions.
242 See Murphy, supra note 228 (quoting Mark Gribben, public manager for the Michigan
Press Association, "'I don't believe terrorists file FOIA requests'); see also Kirtley Interview,
supra note 27 ("There are apocryphal tales going back to, frankly, the Reagan administration
about operatives for foreign powers using the FOI for the purpose of getting classified
information. But they've never been demonstrated to be true.").
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